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ONRENEWABLE resources such as oil and natural gas play an
important role in the world economy. For instance, sharp in-
creases in oil prices created an "energy crisis" in the developed
countries in the 1970s. This crisis had major macroeconomic conse-
quences and led to a series of policy initiatives in various countries.' The
desire of the developed countries to maintain secure oil supplies and to
prevent control of those supplies by hostile powers has led to considera-
ble international conflict.2 Taxation played a key role in many of the cri-
sis initiatives and also has had a major influence on the development of
oil and gas resources in the United States and other countries during non-
crisis periods. 3
Extraction of minerals, oil, or natural gas involves several phases. In
an "exploration" phase, the emphasis is on finding areas with potential
deposits. This phase often involves geological analysis. Exploration
reduces, but does not eliminate, uncertainty about a prospect. After a
promising area is identified, the "development" phase begins. For oil and
gas, this means drilling a test well that will resolve much of the remaining
uncertainty. If the test well is a success, development may continue
through drilling enough other wells to remove the oil or gas in an efficient
and timely manner. Finally, there is the "production" phase. Over a pe-
riod of years, the owners operate the wells, perhaps suspending opera-
1. See, e.g., GERARD M. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXES AND SUBSIDIES: A REPORT TO
THE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION 1-2 (1974); DANIEL YERGIN,
THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 651-698 (1991).
2. The first "oil shock" took place in 1973 and necessitated U.S. aid to Israel during
the Yom Kippur War. The second oil shock began in December of 1978 and was later
fueled by the Iran Hostage Crisis in November of 1979 and the Russian invasion of Af-
ghanistan in December of 1979. These events prompted President Carter to take a hard
line with the Soviet Union: "Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force." YERGIN, supra note 1, at 702. Saddam
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 precipitated another oil shock and the Gulf
War. See YERGIN, supra note 1, at 603-06, 684-702, 769-79. The September 11, 2001 at-
tacks on the World Trade Center initiated another round of concern about the impact of oil
supply issues on U.S. foreign policy. See, e.g., Amity Shlaes, No Need to be Deterred by the
Oil Weapon: U.S. Policy toward Iraq is Being Shaped by Mistaken Fears that Extending the
War on Terror Would Bring a 1970s Price Shock, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at 21.
3. See, e.g., Present Law and Proposals Relating to Increasing Domestic Energy Pro-
duction and Reserves: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Agric. JCS-23-90 (1990);
Carlo A. Favero, Taxation and the Optimization of Oil Exploration and Production: The
UK Continental Shelf, 44 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 187, 188-91 (1992).
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tions when prices are low and resuming later. This article studies the
impact of taxes on the development and exploration phases.4 The discus-
sion is largely in terms of oil and gas, but many of the points apply to
other extractive industries as well.
The potential impact of tax rules on exploration and development
raises two concerns. First, it is desirable to exploit nonrenewable re-
sources in an economically efficient manner. Tax incentives may cause
producers to develop resources more quickly or more slowly than is eco-
nomically desirable. Tax rules also may have "neutrality" consequences
in that they cause producers to make the wrong choice about which
projects to develop. Second, since tax rules affect the pattern of explora-
tion and development, the rules may affect the security of supplies. For
example, a policy that encourages exploration activities but that discour-
ages immediate development of these supplies creates an inventory of
known reserves that the nation may call upon in an emergency. These
"national security" concerns have played a major role in public discussion
of government policy with respect to oil and gas and certain "strategic"
minerals.5
Part I shows that the practical (as opposed to ideal) income tax treat-
ments that are considered "correct" may lead to serious deviations from
neutrality between mineral projects with different characteristics. This is
a particularly acute problem for taxation of mineral enterprises, because
these enterprises consist largely of deciding when to exercise options to
engage in projects with diverse traits. Part II discusses some of the main
alternatives for taxing mineral enterprises and presents a stylized model
that is capable of comparing these alternatives. Parts III and IV use op-
tion valuation methods to study the impact of the various tax approaches
on exploration and development incentives for oil and gas. Part V
presents some conclusions.
Many of the formulas in the article require stochastic calculus to de-
rive. In addition, some of the computations require elaborate algorithms.
The body of the article states results without derivation. The Appendix
includes most of the key derivations and discusses the computational
strategy that underlies the simulations reported in the article.
4. There are several good treatments of the production phase. See, e.g., Terry Heaps
& John Helliwell, The Taxation of Natural Resources, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMicS 449-67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985); Jeffrey K. MacKie-
Mason, Some Nonlinear Tax Effects on Asset Values and Investment Decisions Under Un-
certainty, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 301 (1990) (discussing percentage depletion).
5. See, e.g., remarks of Rep. Wright, at the Nat'l Press Club on Apr. 8,1986, quoted in
132 CONG. REC. H1706 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Alexander); Press Re-
lease, United States Congress, Murkowski Questions Enforcement of Iraqi Oil Deal (May
20, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Group file.
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I. NEUTRALITY, EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
A. NONNEUTRALITY OF THE CONVENTIONALLY CORRECT
IDC TREATMENT
In mineral taxation, the conventional wisdom is that provisions like the
election to expense intangible drilling costs under § 263(c) or the availa-
bility of percentage depletion under § 613 for various minerals do not
have an income tax theory rationale and so must stand or fall based on
incentive arguments. Consider the election to expense intangible drilling
costs. Some of the cost of drilling an oil or gas well will be entirely lost if
the well is a "dry hole," a well that does not have commercial quantities
of oil or gas. This cost category includes the labor cost of drilling the well
and certain equipment (such as drilling pipe) that cannot be removed
from the well and salvaged in the event of a dry hole and corresponds
approximately to the "intangible drilling costs" ("IDCs") that the tax-
payer may expense. A separate cost category includes expenditures for
items that the driller may salvage if the well fails. Generally, the taxpayer
may recover the cost of these items only on a delayed basis through the
depreciation or other cost recovery rules that apply.
Allowing the taxpayer to expense IDCs if a well fails is consistent with
an ideal accretion tax.6 The value of these items is zero, and the taxpayer
should be able to recognize a loss. However, in the case of a successful
well, one worth more than its cost, expensing is not theoretically appro-
priate under accretion principles unless the tax rules simultaneously rec-
ognize "income" in the amount of the value of the well.7 Current law
does not take the value of a well into income immediately after drilling.
Instead it taxes receipts net of operating costs as the well produces. Com-
bining this treatment with expensing means that the taxpayer will realize
a higher rate of return than under an ideal accretion tax. 8 The conven-
tional view is that an appropriate response is to force the taxpayer to
capitalize the drilling costs and recover them over time along with the
operating costs. One such recovery rule is "cost depletion," where the
taxpayer deducts each year the same proportion of the remaining basis as
the proportion of total recoverable reserves removed from the well or
mine during the year.9
6. An ideal accretion tax adds the actual receipts from an investment to the change in
value of the investment during each instant and then immediately collects a tax that is a
specified percentage of that sum.
7. Under accretion tax principles, the taxpayer has experienced an increase in value
and should face a tax on this value at the time the well is completed even though no
production has taken place. Thus, if drilling costs $500,000 and the well is worth $700,000
immediately after completion, then the taxpayer should recognize $200,000 in income at
that time. Effectively, the taxpayer is immediately deducting the $500,000 but only in con-
junction with recognition of the $700,000 increase in value.
8. See infra notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text.
9. If cost depletion applies during the entire life of the well or mine and if all the
depletable expenses occur up front, then each annual deduction is the proportion of initial
depletable basis equal to the proportion of total initial reserves removed during that year.
For many minerals, however, the taxpayer must calculate the depletion deduction for any
1686 [Vol. 55
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There is a serious problem with this conventional approach that does
not exist under the ideal accretion tax. The ideal accretion tax is "neu-
tral" between projects: If this tax is applied to all projects, it will not
change the value of any project. 10 Thus, if project A and project B re-
quire the same start-up cost, but project A is more valuable than project
B without considering taxes, then the same will be true after application
of an accretion tax. The tax system will not distort choices among
projects.
The conventional approach is nonneutral in ways that are potentially
significant for extractive industries. Consider an oil and gas firm choos-
ing between drilling two types of wells, type A and type B. Type A wells
are certain to be successful in the sense that each well will produce com-
mercial quantities of oil. Type B wells have only a ten percent chance of
success, but, if successful, will produce ten times as much revenue as the
type A wells. Suppose that the time pattern of production and revenue
for one successful type B well will be the same as the time pattern of the
revenue for ten type A wells, that the cost of drilling type A and type B
wells is the same, and that the cost of operating the wells is zero. Finally,
assume that the success of any given type B well is independent of the
success or failure of any other such well and that the firm can drill a large
number of type B wells.
Drilling a large number of type B wells or the same number of type A
wells will tend to result in identical economic outcomes. Only about one-
tenth of the type B wells will succeed, but a successful type B well will
produce revenue identical in magnitude and timing to the revenue from
ten type A wells. Now suppose that the tax law requires that taxpayers
capitalize intangible drilling costs. Since type A wells are always success-
ful, the taxpayer will capitalize the entire amount of IDC expended on
these wells. In contrast, nine-tenths of the type B wells are failures, and
the taxpayer will expense the IDCs invested in these wells. The effective
rule for a project that involves large numbers of type B wells will be that
ninety percent of IDCs are deductible and only ten percent must be capi-
talized. This set of "conventional" rules will favor the type B wells.
particular year using percentage depletion if that yields a larger deduction. See I.R.C.
§ 613(a) (2002). As a result, in some years, the taxpayer may deduct a proportion of initial
cost that exceeds the proportion of reserves removed during that year. This deduction will
reduce depletable basis and lower the amount of cost depletion available in later years as a
function of reserves removed. For a more extended discussion, see infra text accompanying
note 28.
10. See Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure In-
variant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964). Professor Samuelson showed that eco-
nomic depreciation, that is, deducting the decline in value of an asset during each tax
period, results in each taxpayer valuing the asset exactly the same, regardless of the tax
rate that applies to the taxpayer. Taxpayers in higher brackets receive lower net amounts
because they pay higher taxes on revenues net of depreciation. However, they also have
lower after-tax discount rates that make future cash flows more valuable. The two effects
exactly cancel out. The same result is true for assets that appreciate or fluctuate in value.
The mathematics in Professor Samuelson's proof does not depend on the sign of the value
changes in the asset.
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B. AN OPTION PERSPECTIVE
The example in the previous Section illustrates an important point
about mineral exploration and development projects. When a taxpayer
controls the mineral rights or the development rights for a given prop-
erty, the taxpayer has the right to proceed with exploration, development,
or mineral production but is not obligated to do so. In short, the right to
explore, the right to develop, and the right to produce mineral properties
are options, and valuing any of these rights is an exercise in option valua-
tion. At any given time a taxpayer will hold or may acquire options with
respect to properties that have different characteristics. In the example,
the properties differed in the probability of success and in potential
reserves. Properties may also differ across other parameters, like the cost
of developing the property or the time that it takes to remove the mineral
deposits. Particular tax rules may favor properties with particular charac-
teristics over properties that are economically equivalent. Part III studies
the neutrality problems that arise from a variety of rules, including a rule
that is equivalent to capitalizing IDCs.
Before proceeding further, it is important to illustrate the option fea-
tures of mineral investments. Suppose that a particular well will cost
$500,000 to drill and complete, is certain to be successful if drilled, and
will have the following production characteristics:
35,000 barrels of recoverable reserves
7 year recovery period
a constant recovery rate: 5000 barrels per year
Thus, for $500,000, the investor will get seven years of oil production at
the rate of 5000 barrels per year. Prices may change during the project,
and we assume that the oil price process is driven by geometric Brownian
motion:
dP= aPdt + crPdz
This equation means that prices tend to increase at the rate a, but the rate
is subject to a normally distributed perturbation with mean zero and vari-
ance o2 dt.1I If the required expected return on oil projects is P, then
11. Scholars studying investment in mineral industries often assume that mineral
prices follow geometric Brownian motion. This assumption may be motivated more by
tractability than by the desire to model the price process accurately. One leading scholar,
for example, published a paper on oil exploration and development one year that relied on
a geometric Brownian motion price process and published a paper the succeeding year
questioning whether geometric Brownian motion is an appropriate assumption for oil
prices. See Diderik Lund, Petroleum Taxation under Uncertainty: Contingent Claims Analy-
sis with an Application to Norway, 14 ENERGY ECONOMics 23 (1992); Diderik Lund, The
Lognormal Diffusion Is Hardly an Equilibrium Price Process for Exhaustible Resources, 25
J. ENVT'L ECON. & MGMT. 235 (1993).
Although Professor Lund's precise arguments against the accuracy of geometric Brown-
ian motion in representing oil prices do not apply here, there is an argument for using a
mean-reverting process instead of geometric Brownian motion. There is some evidence of
mean reversion in oil prices, at least if one considers the price series extending back into
the last century rather than restricting tests to more recent data. Furthermore, valuations
will differ significantly if one uses a mean-reverting process instead of geometric Brownian
1688 [Vol. 55
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define 5 as the difference p - a. This quantity 5 is the "convenience
yield" for oil and can be thought of as the dividend rate for the oil pro-
ject. 12 Given these definitions, the net present value of investing the
$500,000 in order to do the project immediately is:
NPV(P) = RP(1- e-r) Id
8T
where P is the current oil price, R is recoverable reserves, T is the recov-
ery period in years, and Id is the $500,000 development cost.13
The classical investment decision rule is that the investor should pro-
ceed if the project has a net present value greater than zero. This rule
would be correct if the investor's alternatives were doing the project now
or losing the opportunity. This feature does not characterize mineral in-
vestment opportunities. 14 The individual or entity that controls the min-
eral or development rights may choose to delay development into the
future. Sometimes such a delay is an obvious choice. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the net present value is only slightly above zero. An increase in
price will drive this value up, and then net present value may be substan-
tial. If prices are volatile, the odds of seeing a significantly higher price in
the not-too-distant future are quite high (even if the expected increase, a,
is zero). As a result, the investor is clearly better off waiting.
It is worth noting that the right to do the project is valuable even if the
net present value of currently engaging in the project is negative. There
is a chance that prices will increase enough in the future to make the
motion. See Lead Wey, Effects of Mean-reversion on the Valuation of Undeveloped Oil
Reserves and the Results of the Optimal Investment Rules (1993) (unpublished B.S. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
This version does not include price computations using mean-reverting processes. Such
computations are sufficiently difficult that using these processes would make it very hard, if
not impossible, to derive the desired prices in a reasonable amount of time. Computing
some of the numbers in this version (e.g., the ones in Tables XIX and XX infra) by making
the "easy" assumption of geometric Brownian motion for the oil price process still re-
quired several days of computer time.
12. Total expected return is M, and oil prices increase at the expected rate a. To reach
the expected gain, there must be some kind of payout or return in an amount 8 = p - a.
Thus, one may think of 5 as a dividend rate.
13. The first term on the right hand side is the present value of production. Using RIT
as the annual recovery rate, this term is exactly what one would get by using a conventional
present value computation with a discount rate of . Normally, the stochastic nature of P
means that formulas for present value will differ from conventional ones, usually including
additional terms. However, the linearity of the solution here means that there will be no
additional terms.
The expression in the text assumes operating costs are zero and that operation will con-
tinue until the well is depleted. Adding operating costs requires a more complex treatment
because one must deal with the situation where prices fall so that the value of production is
less than the operating cost to produce it. This introduces other options-the ability to
abandon the project and the ability to temporarily suspend production-into the valuation.
14. Scholars have been aware of the need to analyze mineral exploration and develop-
ment investments as options for at least a decade and a half. One important early paper
analyzes offshore petroleum leases as options. See James L. Paddock et al., Option Valua-





Since the investor owns an option (with no obligation) to do the pro-
ject, the key task is to value that option, rather than to compute the net
present value that would accrue due to immediate execution of the pro-
ject. Some of the features of the option value already are evident. So
long as there is some hope of future price increases, the option value is
positive, even if prices are currently low and the value of immediate exe-
cution is negative. As prices increase from a low level, the value of the
option will increase. A higher current price makes it more likely that the
price level will reach a point in the near future where it is worth doing the
project.
It turns out as a mathematical matter that there is a certain "investment
threshold price," P*, such that the investor should do the project when the
actual mineral price equals or exceeds P*. It is easy to provide some intu-
ition for the existence of such a threshold price. When the actual price is
such that the net present value of the project is zero, the investor faces no
risk from waiting. Since current execution of the project would provide
no surplus (in the form of positive net present value), the investor will not
lose anything if prices decline. However, suppose that prices are "high"
so that the project has substantial net present value if executed. In this
case, a price decline will be harmful, delaying or destroying surplus that
the investor could have captured immediately. At some point, the poten-
tial losses from future price declines will offset the potential gains from
price increases, and the investor will opt for doing the project.
For the oil project above, the investment threshold price is $35.631 per
barrel. The price at which net present value is zero is $16.379 per barrel.
At an oil price of around $20 per barrel, typical during the 1990s, the
project would have a net present value of about $110,000. Nonetheless, it
is optimal to wait for the price to increase to $35.631. The following table
indicates the value of the option and the net present value of immediate
execution for various oil prices:
15. The only exception is where the price of the mineral declines to zero. Under geo-
metric Brownian motion, zero is an "absorbing barrier." Once the price reaches zero, it
can never be positive again. In that instance, the project never will be worthwhile. As a




Net Present Value and Option Value at Various Oil Prices










Note that the option value is a substantial amount, $139,458, when the
net present value of the project is zero. Net present value may be a poor
indicator of worth when ownership includes an option aspect.16
The threshold investment price is a useful instrument for studying the
nonneutrality of different tax regimes. Part III considers projects with
different traits that all have the same threshold price in the absence of
taxes. Adding taxes produces a pattern of new threshold prices that gen-
erally differ among the various projects. The price differences indicate
how the impact of the tax system varies as a function of project
characteristics.
Option value analysis using threshold prices allows one to study other
aspects besides neutrality. For instance, some investments are in "explo-
ration" rather than "development." The exploration phase involves dis-
covering whether there are any minerals in a certain area and, if so, the
likelihood of recovery, the amount that is recoverable, the time required
for recovery, and the cost of recovery. Choosing to explore a particular
parcel amounts to purchasing a "development option" since the mineral
owner has the right but not the obligation to develop the parcel after
learning about the underlying minerals by spending money on explora-
tion. Part IV analyzes exploration incentives as a function of tax treat-
ment using the threshold price approach.
16. This point is well understood and is emphasized in elementary finance texts. See,
e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 620-22
(6th ed. 2000) (negative NPV project may be worth doing because it gives the firm an
option to do future projects that may have substantial value).
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II. A STYLIZED MODEL
Parts III and IV set forth the major results. This Part lays some
groundwork. Section A discusses the relevant tax rules. Section B in-
troduces the model that is the basis of the results in Parts III and IV.
Section C discusses the limitations of the model, and Section D lists the
major policy alternatives considered in Parts III and IV.
A. THE TAX TREATMENT OF MINERAL EXPLORATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION
This Section discusses the U.S. tax treatment of mineral enterprises.
Although the main focus in the article is on oil and gas, some considera-
tion is given to major rules that currently do not apply to oil and gas;
these rules are examined because they may be applicable in the future.
1. Exploration and Development Deductions
For minerals other than oil and gas, the U.S. tax system draws a major
distinction between "exploration" and "development" for purposes of
specifying a tax treatment for expenditures. Section 617, which applies to
most minerals other than oil and gas,17 defines mining exploration ex-
penses as "expenditures ... for the purpose of ascertaining the existence,
location, extent, or quality of any deposit or ore."18 In contrast, § 616,
which applies to the same class of minerals, defines development ex-
penses as "expenditures ... for the development of a mine or other natu-
ral deposit . . . after the existence of ores or minerals in commercially
marketable quantities has been disclosed."' 19
Section 616 allows the taxpayer to elect expensing of development
costs. Section 617 allows a similar election with respect to exploration
costs but provides for "recapture" when the projects reach the production
stage. The recapture consists of denying depletion deductions until the
total amount of the depletion that would be allowable exceeds the explo-
ration costs that were expensed.20 However, the taxpayer may elect to
take the amount expensed back into income at the time production be-
gins and then capitalize that amount so that it is deducted over the life of
the project.21 Expensing under § 616 and § 617 is not available for tangi-
ble property that is depreciable under § 167.
The law treats oil and gas exploration and development expenses quite
differently. Exploration costs must be capitalized. These costs include
the cost of geological analysis of prospects, expenses of leasing a potential
17. The section applies to all minerals eligible for percentage depletion, except for oil
and gas. I.R.C. § 617(a)(1) (2002). Most minerals are eligible for percentage depletion,
the exceptions being items like dirt and gravel.
18. § 617(a)(1). Section 617 provides for a deduction of certain exploration expenses.
Normally, the taxpayer must capitalize these expenses and recover them during the pro-
duction phase of the mines or wells.





development property, the cost of core-hole wells drilled to obtain geo-
logical data, the cost of seismic work, and other similar costs. 2 2 Seismic
work is a key component of modern exploration efforts. Seismic analysis
involves sending shock waves from multiple sources into the ground.
These waves travel at different speeds through formations that contain oil
or natural gas, and one obtains a two-dimensional or three-dimensional
diagram with "bright spots" indicating potential hydrocarbon deposits.
Not all the bright spots contain deposits and some of the deposits may not
be recoverable due to low porosity or other causes. A petroleum geolo-
gist can correlate the location of the bright spots with information about
underground formations to sharpen the knowledge that emerges from the
seismic information. At the end of this process, one has an estimate of
the probability of success for drilling, as well as information about the
extent of reserves, the number of wells that will be required, and the de-
pletion rate. An actual determination of success requires drilling one or
more test wells.
It is at this point that intangible drilling costs enter the picture. There
are two phases to a successful oil well: drilling and completion. Drilling
involves producing the bore. After the bore is finished, various tests are
run that indicate (with very high probability) whether or not production
is feasible. If production is not feasible, the bore is plugged and aban-
doned. If production is feasible, then the "completion" process begins.
The well is fitted with production tubing and any equipment that may be
necessary to remove the hydrocarbons. Completion costs are substantial,
although usually only about a quarter to a half as large as drilling costs.
An important financial point is that the investor does not pay any com-
pletion costs if it is clear from the tests that the well is not viable. A large
portion of the drilling cost (including expenditures on testing) falls in the
intangible drilling cost category. The investor will not recover this por-
tion in the event of a dry hole.
It is worth noting that drilling some wells may not involve very much
uncertainty. An important example is so-called "offset" wells. Suppose
that a firm observes a bright spot with very large horizontal extent. It
drills an initial well right into the center of the spot. This well is success-
ful. To drain all the reserves (or to drain them more quickly), it may be
best to drill several other "offset" wells into other parts of the bright
spot.23 For example, the formation may not be very porous so that the
first well can only remove the oil in the portion of the bright spot nearest
the well bore. In this situation, the offset wells will succeed with very
high probability.
The Code allows the investor to elect expensing of IDCs and draws no
distinction based on the probability of drilling success or whether the well
is an offset well. This treatment is very different from how IDCs would
22. See Internal Revenue Manual 4232.8-12, Exhibit 200-4.
23. "Offset" describes the fact that the well is being drilled immediately adjacent to
another well that is successful and has known production characteristics.
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be treated if § 616 and § 617 applied. In the case of offset wells, there is a
strong argument that "the existence of ores or minerals in commercially
marketable quantities has been disclosed" prior to the drilling.24 The
original test well already indicates the existence of hydrocarbons in the
bright spot. As a result, it would be reasonable to classify IDCs as devel-
opment costs under § 616 in the case of offset wells. For the original test
well, however, IDCs would fail the § 616 requirements (to be classified as
development expenses) since the existence of commercially recoverable
hydrocarbons is not clear prior to drilling. The test well drilling expenses
naturally fall under the definition of exploration expenses in § 617 since
they are spent "for the purpose of ascertaining the existence, location,
extent, or quality of any deposit. '2 5
This discussion makes clear that the law's treatment of oil and gas dif-
fers substantially from its treatment of other minerals, primarily because
§ 616 and § 617 do not apply to oil and gas. These sections require distin-
guishing between drilling or digging that is exploratory and drilling or
digging that is developmental, a distinction that is not employed in the oil
and gas rules.26
2. Production Stage Deductions
Taxpayers may deduct operating expenses (such as labor) in a mining
or oil and gas venture as the expenses are paid or incurred. A more com-
plex issue is the recovery of exploration and development expenses that
have been capitalized. These expenses create "depletable basis" in the
property. The traditional rule is "cost depletion" which allows the tax-
payer to recover each year the proportion of remaining basis equal to the
proportion of remaining recoverable reserves removed during the year.2 7
If the only basis-reducing deductions are cost depletion deductions and if
24. The quoted language is a central part of the test in I.R.C. § 616(a) for whether
expenditures are "development" expenditures.
25. § 617(a).
26. The distinction is not always terribly clear in the case of minerals other than oil
and gas. The difficult borderline between exploration and development expenses has re-
sulted in a significant body of case law. 1 BORIS I. BjTrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FED-
ERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GiF-rs § 26.2.2, 26.2.3 (2d/3d ed., rev. vol. July
2002), available at http://www.riahome.com/.
Furthermore, the distinction would not necessarily be as obvious for oil and gas as the
argument above seems to suggest. Not all offset wells succeed, and some may fail because
the drilling takes place near the edge of the bright spot. It may not be clear that the
formation characteristics will be exactly the same on the edge of the bright spot as in the
middle. The porosity and the density of hydrocarbon deposit may be lower than in the
center so that the reserves on the edge are not commercially recoverable. One could argue
that drilling under this type of uncertainty is "for the purpose of ascertaining the existence,
location, extent, or quality of any deposit or ore" rather than "for the development of a
mine or other natural deposit ... after the existence of ores or minerals in commercially
marketable quantities has been disclosed." I.R.C. §§ 616(a), 617(a)(1). That is, one could
argue that the IDCs for uncertain offset wells are exploration expenses instead of develop-
ment expenses.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (2002). Thus, if at the beginning of the year there were
100,000 barrels of recoverable oil left in reserves, and the taxpayer removed and sold
40,000 barrels during the year, then the taxpayer could deduct 40% of the depletable basis
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the recoverable reserves are estimated correctly in advance, then the tax-
payer will deduct the basis at exactly the same rate as the reserves are
removed from the well or mine.
The alternative method of basis recovery is percentage depletion. This
method permits the taxpayer to deduct a percentage of the gross income
from the well or mine as a depletion deduction. Percentage depletion is
available for most minerals but only in special instances for oil and gas.
2 8
In any given year the taxpayer must use whichever of percentage or cost
depletion yields the largest deduction. As a result, there may be periods
where basis is reduced at a more rapid rate than reserves. In that case,
future cost depletion will yield a lower deduction per barrel removed
than otherwise. Percentage depletion may reduce basis to zero, but not
below. If the basis is zero, cost depletion will not yield any deductions.
Percentage depletion is limited to 50% of the taxable income from the
associated mineral property or a higher percentage (65% or 100%) of
taxable income in the case of oil and gas wells for which percentage de-
pletion is permitted.2 9
B. A THREE-PHASE MODEL
The previous Section indicates that U.S. tax law draws a distinction
between development and exploration. This distinction also has policy
significance. In some instances, the government may want to encourage
exploration as opposed to development or vice versa. For example, it
may be desirable for national security purposes to have a source of do-
mestic supply for certain minerals should foreign sources become unavail-
able. Pursuing such a goal may mean encouraging exploration but
discouraging development and production. This scheme would en-
courage mineral enterprises to locate recoverable amounts of mineral but
would leave the minerals in the ground for later exploitation. If foreign
supplies are cut off, the government could remove the disincentives for
development, and the nation would have a stream of new mineral sup-
plies, at least for a while.30 In light of the importance of the exploration/
development distinction, a model that includes exploration, development,
and production as separate phases is appropriate.
remaining as of the start of the year. This basis will have been reduced by depletion deduc-
tions from prior years.
28. I.R.C. § 613A details these special instances. The major special instance is that
percentage depletion is permissible up to a certain amount of annual production for tax-
payers who are not refiners or retailers. I.R.C. § 613A(c)-(d) (2002).
29. See § 613A(d)(1) (65% limitation for certain domestic oil and gas producers);
I.R.C. § 613(a) and § 613A(b)(1) (100% limitation for certain natural gas production).
30. Section 617 would tend to bring about this result. That section allows expensing of




1. The Three Phases-Computing Threshold Prices
Each of three phases-exploration, development, and production-in-
volve an option. Exploration is an option. The mineral owner may ex-
plore a property now or may put off exploring it until later. Exploring a
property reveals its development potential, but the owner does not have
to develop immediately. Exercising the development option will result in
wells or mines that the owner may produce, but the owner need not pro-
duce these wells or mines immediately. Part I points out that threshold
investment prices are critical for gauging incentives. These prices deter-
mine when an investor will explore, develop, or produce mineral proper-
ties. So one goal is to compute threshold investment prices for each of
the options.
This Section begins by describing the three phases in terms of oil explo-
ration, development, and production. This article does not explicitly dis-
cuss exploration, development and extraction of minerals other than oil,
but the article does analyze major tax policy alternatives, such as the ap-
proach implicit in § 616 and § 617, that do not apply to oil and gas but
that do apply to other minerals. 31
The first phase is exploration. To model this phase we assume that
there is a large collection of unexplored properties. Each property has
four key traits: oil reserves (R), the number of wells required to drain the
reserves (N), the time required to drain the reserves (T), and the
probability that the property will be a successful producer (Q). Prior to
exploration, the R, N, and T for any particular property are unknown, but
the distribution of each trait in the set of unexplored properties is
known.32
Assume that the distribution of reserves is a Weibull distribution with
characteristic value 500,000 barrels and shape parameter .5. Some per-
centiles of this distribution are as follows:
31. Extending the model to other minerals would require only minor changes in the
model structure. However, the relevant exploration, development and production parame-
ters (such as the relative size of exploration and development costs or the time required for
extraction after successful development) would be quite different for the other minerals.
These differences would affect the choice of policy in ways that Parts III and IV clarify by
indicating the bearing of various parameters on that choice.
32. One can think of these distributions as representing outcomes for a wide variety of
U.S. onshore and offshore properties. This article aims at developing an appropriate ana-





















Assume that the distribution of well life is lognormal with a median of





















The distribution for the number of wells should be conditional on the
amount of reserves since recovering large, dispersed reserves may require
a large number of wells. Assume a lognormal distribution with a median
equal to the reserves divided by 100,000 and with a .08 standard devia-
tion. Some percentiles for this distribution for the case where total
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In order to learn R, N, and T for an unexplored property, the investor
must pay Ie in exploration expenses. Upon making this payment, it is still
unclear whether the reserves actually exist or whether they are recover-
able if they do exist. The only way to find out for sure is to drill a test
well. However, during exploration, the investor does learn Q, the
probability that the property will be a successful producer (of reserves R
through N wells over a time period of 7). With probability (1-Q), the
property will be unproductive. Q is uniformly distributed between 0 and
1.
It is now possible to describe the exploration phase completely. The
investor pays Ie, and then nature selects R, T, and Q independently from
the specified distributions. After the choice for R is clear, nature chooses
an N from the specified distribution that is conditional on the value of R.
When R is higher (more reserves), the distribution tends to require a
higher N (more wells). An implicit assumption is that making a draw
from the exploration pool by paying Ie does not affect the distributions
that apply to future draws. These distributions remain fixed.33
33. Assuming that the distribution for the next draw will not change is convenient for
computational purposes but is somewhat unrealistic. There are some very large oil and gas
deposits such as the East Texas oilfield in the United States. These extend over many
"properties." Exploring properties randomly is likely to result in discovery of the largest
reserve accumulations first. In addition, exploration of one property may yield significant
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After the exploration phase, the investor has a development project
characterized by the four properties R, N, T, and Q. The investor may
pay I, to drill a test well. This payment will resolve the uncertainty ex-
pressed by Q. If the test well indicates success, the investor may pay I, in
order to complete the well and begin production. The investor also has
the option to develop N - 1 other wells each of which will yield R / N in
reserves over a time period of T years. Exercising this option will cost Id
= I, + I,, the total expense for drilling and completing a well.
Production consists of a constant flow of R / NT barrels per year from
each well until the well is depleted. The model here assumes that there
are no operating costs and that once turned on, wells will operate until
depletion. That is, the owner cannot shut a well off when faced with low
prices and then turn it back on later. These assumptions are somewhat
drastic. Well output usually declines over time. Wells can be shut-in and
held for later production at some cost and at some risk that production
potential will be reduced by interrupting production. Operating costs are
generally positive. Nonetheless, as explained in a later Section,34 it
greatly facilitates computing threshold prices and performing simulations
if the production phase is particularly simple. Given that the focus will be
on the impact of taxes on exploration and development activities, precise
modeling of production is not the highest priority.
Since each phase represents a separate option, it is possible to compute
a threshold investment price for each activity under various tax policy
alternatives. For the development phase, the threshold price will depend
on the nature of the development project, i.e., on the values of R, N, T,
and Q that characterize each such project. This dependence allows one to
study whether particular tax policies have a disproportionate impact on
particular types of projects. Finally, since the exploration phase is sepa-
rate and distinct, one can test the impact of tax policies on oil and gas
exploration by observing the different threshold investment prices that
result.
information about adjoining properties. As a result, one would expect the distribution of
reserves for unexplored properties for which there is no information (from nearby ex-
plored properties) to shift downward toward lower reserves at each percentile as mineral
entrepreneurs explore more and more properties.
An additional problem is the assumption that the investor knows what the distribution
of traits for unexplored properties is. Information about trait distributions would arise
from exploration itself. At the point in time before any exploration, entrepreneurs only
would have some prior beliefs about the distributions. They would be able to update their
beliefs as actual exploration results became available.
For a good discussion of both of these points and an illustration of how one might up-
date, see Louis Gordon, Estimation for Large Successive Samples with Unknown Inclusion
Probabilities, 14 ADVANCES IN APPLIED MATHEMATICS 89 (1993).
I do not attempt to incorporate either effect into the model here. Doing so would be
particularly important if the goal were to simulate the entire time path of exploitation of a
nonrenewable resource. Otherwise, one is implicitly assuming that a great deal of explora-
tion has taken place and that the marginal impact on the trait distributions of exploring a
few properties is not very large. This assumption is appropriate for domestic U.S. explora-
tion at present.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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2. Simulated Exploration and Development
Threshold investment prices do not provide all the information that
one might want. To see why, consider the intangible drilling cost example
from Section I.A. That example indicates that a rule requiring capitaliza-
tion of IDCs biases the investor toward low probability development
projects. However, it is not clear that the class of low probability projects
is very important. Consider a particular point in time. The oil price will
be at some level, P. Investors will have explored a large number of
properties, and development will be complete for properties with a
threshold price less than P. There will be an inventory of development
projects with threshold prices greater than P. If P increases by $1, inves-
tors will begin all the projects in the inventory that have development
threshold prices between $P and $P + $1. Low probability projects will
tend to have very high threshold prices. Thus, the projects in inventory
that are likely to be done next may tend to be high probability projects.
In addition, the projects that were done in the past (with threshold prices
less than P) are likely to have been mostly high probability projects.
Thus, the distortion may not matter much because low probability
projects are not a very large proportion of the set of promising develop-
ment projects.
Part III provides some evidence on this point. Low probability projects
have some importance, but the phenomenon just described does seem to
lower the consequences of the distortion. This evidence does not take
into account the possibility that prices will increase greatly in the future
so that investors begin developing many of the low probability projects in
inventory. The tax distortion might then become more significant.
To fully study the question of the importance of this tax distortion, one
must know what the likely effects will be over time. Any such study
should address the impact of a variety of outcomes, such as an era of very
high prices. It may be that the tax distortion does not have very much
impact for the "average" time series of oil prices, but that for ten percent
of possible price paths, large efficiency losses will result.
An easy way to address these issues is by simulation.35 One can choose
a large number of price paths at random, and then examine the impact on
the allocation of resources over time. Evaluative criteria might include:
the discounted present value of oil produced; the discounted present
value of the costs of exploration, development, and production; and the
discounted present value of the development and exploration projects
that remain at the end of the time period examined. 36 The variation of
these criteria as well as their average tendency under different tax poli-
cies would be interesting. The model here provides a basis for such simu-
35. The alternatives of proving theorems or deriving formulas may be extremely diffi-
cult. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 79-111 (Monte Carlo simulation used to com-
pute exploration threshold prices).
36. The simulation would begin with a finite number of unexplored properties and
would limit the number of properties that could be explored during any given time period.
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lations, but I leave actual simulations to future work. It is important to
keep in mind the limitations of threshold investment price analysis and
also the possibility of using a simulation approach to override those
limitations.
C. MODEL LIMITATIONS AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Understanding some important limitations of the model requires a dis-
cussion of some technical, but intuitive, points.
The three phases in the model create three layers of option. Exercising
the exploration option by paying Ie yields a development option. Exercis-
ing the development option by paying I, yields a production option. Ex-
ercising the production option requires paying I, to complete the test well
and Id per well to drill and complete each other well. The result is N
producing wells.
Solving for the values of the various options requires "working back-
ward."'37 For instance, to value the development option, one needs to
know the value of the various production options that may ensue since
exercising the development option will result in a production option.
This solution process means that complexity at the "late" stages like pro-
duction will make computation at the earlier stages difficult. It will be
necessary to make many late stage computations to value options at the
earlier stages since each earlier stage option will be a weighted average of
many possible later stage options. The rest of this Section discusses this
point more precisely and also details the modeling limitations for the pro-
duction and development phases that are necessary to be able to compute
investment threshold prices for the exploration option.
1. The Production Phase
Consider again the production option discussed in Part I.B above.
Starting production from a well (by drilling and completing it) has a cer-
tain net present value that depends on the current oil price. The owner
may choose to wait for the oil price to go higher before producing. When
oil prices are low and the net present value of producing is low or nega-
tive, the option to produce is more valuable than starting production. As
prices increase, however, there is a penalty to delay: If prices fall, the
owner may lose an opportunity to start the project when it has a high net
present value. A similar opportunity may not arise for a long time since it
may take prices a while to return to their present high level. If the oil
price reaches or exceeds a certain "investment threshold price", the in-
vestor should start producing. Option value will equal net present value
at all prices above the investment threshold price since the investor will
exercise the option and begin producing in response to any such price. In
37. For a good elementary discussion of solution methods for this type of problem, see




effect, the net present value function and the option value function are
"pasted" together (and become identical) at the investment threshold
price.
How does one find the investment threshold price? It is possible to
compute a value for the option as a function of the oil price up to an
unknown constant and also to compute net present value as a function of
the oil price. One then solves for the unknown constant and the invest-
ment threshold price using two equations: a value equation, and a smooth
pasting equation. The value equation sets the value of the option equal
to the expression for net present value. This equation would immediately
yield the investment threshold price if we knew the unknown constant in
the option value. The smooth pasting equation requires that the option
value and net present value functions meet smoothly at the investment
threshold value point where the functions are "pasted" together.38 Using
this equation along with the value equation yields the unknown constant
and the investment threshold price.
The significance of this solution method is that the ability to solve each
stage easily depends on having convenient expressions for the values of
the later stage. Suppose, for example, that we did not have a formula for
net present value as a function of oil price but had to make a numerical
estimate each time we wanted to know net present value for a particular
price. Then, even if we knew the unknown constant in the option value
expression, we could not solve the value equation explicitly. Instead we
would try various prices using a system that promises to bring us closer to
the actual investment threshold price after each step. If we try a price
that results in option value in excess of net present value, we know that
the trial price is too low. On the other hand, a price that has the opposite
consequence is too high. We would then try a price in between and con-
tinue the process until we are within some tolerable interval of the cor-
rect result.
Using this approach to find the investment threshold price for a few
production projects would not be difficult. The problem arises in solving
for the investment threshold price for the other phases, especially the ex-
ploration phase. Approximating the exploration threshold price requires
computing the value of the production project (as a function of price and
other parameters) millions of times. If each of these millions of calcula-
tions involved a numerical approximation algorithm, it probably would
be impossible to estimate the exploration threshold price in a reasonable
amount of time.
Unfortunately, some of the production features that one might wish to
include lead to exactly this type of problem. For example, including oper-
ating costs in the production model makes it necessary to specify what
38. The derivatives of the functions must be equal at the investment threshold price.
This condition is necessary for optimality. Otherwise, it would be better for the investor to
start producing at a higher or lower price. For an elementary explanation, see DIXIT &
PINDYCK, supra note 37, at 130-32.
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happens if prices fall, production declines, or costs increase to the point
where the well is operating in the red. In the real world, operators will
either "shut-in" the well, hoping to resume operations later, or will aban-
don and plug the well. Adding an option to suspend operations or an
option to terminate them (prior to draining all the reserves) means that
one must solve for additional threshold prices (for abandonment, suspen-
sion, and start up after suspension) simultaneously with solving for the
investment threshold price (for initial start-up of production). The result-
ing equations are typically nonlinear in a way that precludes writing down
a formula for the investment threshold price.39 Furthermore, solving
such nonlinear equations by approximation relies heavily on starting with
"good guesses."'40 If an algorithm has only a small chance of failing, it
will be inadequate when the threshold price for the production option
needs to be computed millions of times in order to compute a threshold
price for exploration.
These considerations lead to use of the simple model described above
with no operating costs and no option to suspend operations in hope of
higher future prices. Using a simple model of this sort means that only
very rough modeling of the tax features for the production phase is possi-
ble. In particular, it is impossible to capture all the features of current
depletion policy. This policy includes an income test and shifting back
and forth between percentage depletion and cost depletion. Since there
are no operating costs in our model, it is hard to include the income test
in any realistic way. Furthermore, modeling the switching between per-
centage and cost depletion in a stochastic environment is tricky.4 1
As a result of these limitations, I consider only a very simplified version
of percentage depletion. Instead of applying a tax rate, s, to the costless
revenues that flow from the project, the tax rate is adjusted to allow for
percentage depletion at a rate rl. The adjusted tax rate is s(1-rq). Further-
more, I add percentage depletion as a bonus to cost depletion, if any.
This bonus approach avoids having to model shifts between cost deple-
tion and percentage depletion. This simple version of percentage deple-
tion is equivalent to a negative severance tax at rate rjs. Using a negative
(and linear) severance tax to model percentage depletion may be a good
rough approximation, 42 but it clearly misses effects that arise from the
fact that the actual percentage depletion allowance is nonlinear.43
39. See id. at 218, 233-34.
40. See WILLIAM PRESS ET AL., NUMERICAL RECIPES: THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC COM-
PUTING 241 (1987).
41. The leading study of percentage depletion assumes that capital expenditures are
expensed. See MacKie-Mason, supra note 4, at 310. As a result, there is no basis for cost
depletion, and no need to consider switching back and forth. The ensuing analysis ends up
being complicated enough and culminates in some numerical simulations. See id. at 322-24.
42. See Heaps & Helliwell, supra note 4, at 456-57.
43. See MacKie-Mason, supra note 4, at 301-03, 325 (showing the importance of con-
sidering the interaction of nonlinear tax rules with uncertainty and using percentage deple-
tion as one example).
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There is an additional simplification for the cases where the rules call
for capitalizing exploration or development expenses and recovery
through cost depletion. Since the level of taxable income during produc-
tion does not affect percentage depletion and since production of each
well will continue at a known rate until exhaustion at a known future
time, it is possible to "front load" the capitalization of expenses. The
exact time pattern of production is known in advance so that the time
pattern of cost depletion allowances is also known. I assume that r, the
riskless interest rate, is fixed throughout time and is the same for all ma-
turities. As a result, if the taxpayer incurred $X in capitalized expendi-
tures, then at the time production starts, the taxpayer will receive a flow
of depletion deductions worth
1 - erTx
rT
as of that time. Front-loading the depletion deductions rather than con-
sidering them as a flow simplifies the analysis.
Another consequence of not having a realistic model of percentage de-
pletion is that it is difficult to model § 617 precisely. That section allows
the expensing of exploration costs, but then recaptures them by eliminat-
ing percentage depletion until total percentage depletion exceeds the
amount expensed. The taxpayer may elect an alternative treatment
where the amount expensed becomes income when production begins, is
capitalized at that point, and then is recovered through depletion. In-
stead of modeling § 617 explicitly, Parts III and IV consider a policy
where the elective treatment is mandatory. This approach is called "ex-
pensing with recapture."
The following equation expresses the present value of producing R bar-
rels of reserves at a constant rate over a time period of T through N wells
that cost Id each to develop:44
NP V(P) = RP (1- s + 7s) (1- e f) _ a (-Cd)(1-s)+cd(1-s 
1Te) r
(5T IL rT '
where r is the riskless rate, 5 is the required "dividend" rate, s is the tax
rate, 1l is the rate of percentage depletion, and Cd is one if development
costs are capitalized and zero if they are expensed.
2. Adjusting Return Parameters for Taxes
In the equation for NPV(P) it appears that neither 5 nor r is adjusted
for taxes. 8 is the difference between the risk adjusted expected return, P,
and the expected growth rate for the oil price, a. p is equal to the riskless
rate, r, plus some risk premium, y. The required pre-tax or no-tax values
of r and y may differ from the required after-tax values. Whether or not
44. This expression ignores exploration costs, implicitly assuming the taxpayer may
expense these costs without facing any recapture when production begins.
2002] 1705
SMU LAW REVIEW
there is a difference depends on the relationship between the oil and gas
tax rules and the "external tax environment," the rules applied to the rest
of the sectors of the economy. We assume that the oil and gas sector is
small enough compared to all other sectors, that required after-tax rates
of return, r and y, will be set in the outside sectors.
The risky portion of the returns consist of the revenues represented by
the first term on the right hand side of the NPV(P) equation. This por-
tion is being taxed on a cash flow basis at rate (1-s+qs). If a cash flow tax
applies to the outside sectors as well, then the pre-tax riskless rate from
these sectors, and the risk premium (appropriate to oil and gas) that fol-
lows from these sectors will apply without modification to the oil and gas
sector.45 The equation for NPV(P) above will be correct under the inter-
pretation that r and y (and thus 3) equal their pre-tax values.
A different situation arises if the external tax is not a global cash flow
tax. Suppose, for instance, that the outside sectors are taxed using a uni-
form accretion tax at rate tA. If rp is the pre-tax riskless rate, the after-tax
riskless rate in the outside sectors will be rp(l-tA). Since we assume that
the outside sectors are very large compared to the oil and gas sector, the
after-tax riskless return in the oil and gas sector also will have to be rp(1-
tA). The fact that this riskless rate differs from rp will have a second order
impact on yp, the pre-tax risk premium. 46 We will have to use the follow-
ing values for r and 3 in the equation for NPV(P) and all other equations
that depend on r and 3:
r r( - tA)
5= rp(1-tA)+, -1 rp-tA -a
where a is the expected growth rate of the oil price.
45. Under a cash flow tax, the investor receives an immediate deduction for amounts
invested. This deduction reduces the after-tax investment amount by the proportion (1 -
s), where s is the tax rate. At the same time, the investor gives up the same proportion, (1
- s), of all future returns. As a result, the investor effectively holds the proportion (1 - s)
of the investment and will require the same riskless rate of return and risk premium as for
the original investment. The government holds the remaining proportion, s.
This argument assumes away any general equilibrium effects that might impact the ris-
kless rate of return or the risk premium. These effects could arise because the government
redistributes its portion to people with different risk tolerance or time preference charac-
teristics than the original owners. I ignore any such effects.
46. The cash flow tax still cuts investment costs and returns by the same amount. To
first order, then, the risk premium should be the same. However, the change in the riskless
rate has a small impact on value, and rate-of-return risk depends, roughly speaking, on the
fluctuation of returns versus value. As a result, there is a small ("second order") change in
the risk premium, yp.
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3. The Development Phase
As discussed previously, a development project is the opportunity to
gain with probability Q an option to produce N wells that will yield
reserves of R over a period of T years. There is some investment thresh-
old price for exercising the development option. Call this price P2* where
the subscript "2" symbolizes that development is the second phase. If
development is successful, then the investor will hold a production option
with a separate investment threshold price that we will call P 3*.4 7 I as-
sume that development takes place instantaneously.48 Under this as-
sumption, P3* will be less than P 2 *.49 This inequality means that the
production option collapses into the development option: Exercising the
development option (because the oil price, P, is above P2*) implies that
one also will exercise the production option (since the oil price also will
exceed P3") if development is successful. 50 As a result, it is only necessary
to compute an investment threshold price for the development option.
The investment threshold price for the production option is not meaning-
ful since the investor always will exercise this option following successful
development.
A similar collapse does not occur between the exploration option and
the development option. Exploration means paying a sum, le, in order to
draw a development project at random. These development projects will
have a wide range of investment threshold prices. Some of these will be
below the oil price that justifies exploration, and some will be above that
price. As a result, the investor will not always immediately execute the
development option that flows out of exploration. 51
47. The subscript "3" stands for the fact that production is the third stage, following
exploration (stage 1) and development (stage 2).
48. Failing to make this assumption would mean that the model would have to take
into account the possibility that oil prices will change during the development period. This
possibility would require modeling an option to abandon development (if prices fall
enough) and would require considering changes in P3* that may occur in the interim. The
ensuing complexities would make computing the value of the exploration option very
difficult.
49. It is easy to see why the inequality is true. It costs some amount of money, I,, to
exercise the development option. If one knows that prices are too low for immediate exe-
cution of the ensuing production project, it is worthwhile waiting until prices increase at
least to the point where immediate execution is justified. In the meantime, one can earn
interest on the amount I,, the cost of exercising the development option. Thus, the investor
will not exercise a development option unless prices increase above the threshold price,
P3 , for starting production. As a consequence, the investment threshold price for develop-
ment, P2*, must be greater than or equal to P3*, the investment threshold price for
production.
50. If development is not successful, there will never be any production, and the pro-
duction option will be worthless.
51. In fact, if the oil price is at or slightly above the level that justifies exploration,
immediate development will be exception rather than the rule. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 90-95 (at the exploration threshold price, the probability of immediate develop-
ment is in the 5% to 10% range).
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4. The Exploration Phase
Since exploration is a random draw from the set of possible develop-
ment projects, there may be a substantial or even indefinite delay in re-
covering expenses that are capitalized. This delay will occur if the
development project has an investment threshold price far above the cur-
rent oil price. The law is fairly firm in putting off the deduction of ex-
penses for low value projects, recognizing, in the spirit of option theory,
that these projects may have value in the future.5 2
In some cases, however, the taxpayer has another alternative. If the
development option is worth less than the total exploration cost, then the
taxpayer can sell the option and take a loss. Furthermore, low value de-
velopment options that are worth somewhat more than the total explora-
tion cost may fall below that level if oil prices fall. In effect, the taxpayer
has a "timing option" to realize losses for development options. 53 Includ-
ing this timing option in the analysis would be complex, so I do not do so.
Failure to include it means that the increases in investment threshold
price for the exploration option due to forcing capitalization of explora-
tion costs observed in Part IV are biased upwards. 54 Approximating the
impact of tax loss trading indicates that the prospect of such trading may
reduce the impact of capitalization by as much as 80%. 55
D. TAX ALTERNATIVES FOR STUDY
Parts III and IV will examine twelve tax alternatives. These twelve
alternatives emerge from three alternatives for the treatment of explora-
tion expenses, two alternatives for the treatment of development ex-
penses, and the decision about whether or not to allow percentage
depletion.
For exploration costs, the three alternatives are capitalization, expens-
ing, or expensing with recapture. As discussed above, expensing with re-
capture means that the taxpayer may deduct the exploration costs when
52. There must be an "identifiable event" demonstrating that an exploration expendi-
ture is worthless before the owner may deduct the expenditure. Such an event might be
the abandonment of a lease on the explored property or "any event" that establishes that
the information gained by the exploration expense is worthless. See Rev. Rul. 77-188,
1977-1 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 83-105, 1983-2 C.B. 51. Rev. Rul. 83-105 demonstrates, using
examples, how different projects are evaluated under Rev. Rul. 77-188. Of particular in-
terest is "Situation 6," in which no deduction is allowed for exploration expenditures re-
lated to a tract that the taxpayer claimed had "no potential mineral production," because
the taxpayer retained the property. The reasoning is that by retaining the property instead
of abandoning it, the taxpayer demonstrated that the exploration expenses allocated to this
property were not worthless.
53. See George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51
ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983) (timing option for common stock).
54. If the current oil price is just on the threshold where exploration is desirable, it
appears that a large proportion of the development project "draws" will be worth less than
the exploration costs expended to make the draw. For the central case considered in Part
IV, the proportion is close to 60% of all development projects that are not immediately
executed. See infra text accompanying note 86. Thus, it is not possible to dismiss tax-loss
selling as trivial.
55. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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incurred, but, at the time production begins (if ever), the taxpayer must
include these costs in income and then capitalize them according to the
cost depletion rules.
For development costs, the two alternatives are capitalization and ex-
pensing. Because exercising a development option means that the inves-
tor will move immediately to production, a rule of expensing with
recapture is equivalent to capitalization. There is no delay between the
deduction of expenses and the time when the expenses come back into
income and are capitalized. Thus, there is no reason to consider a sepa-
rate rule of expensing with recapture in the case of development costs.
Finally, Parts III and IV consider two cases for percentage depletion:
no percentage depletion and percentage depletion at a 22.5% rate. All
twelve tax scenarios use a tax rate of 40%. Thus, the 22.5% percentage
depletion allowance reduces the tax rate on production from 40% to
31%.
III. TAXES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OPTION
This Part studies the impact of various tax regimes on the development
option by examining how each regime affects the investment threshold
prices for various development projects. Section A sets forth the formula
for P2*, the investment threshold price, and discusses certain aspects of
the formula. Sections B, D, and E consider the impact of various tax
rules on projects with different probabilities of success, on projects with
different production lives, and on projects with different development
costs, respectively. Section C considers the impact of percentage deple-
tion on the investment threshold price.
A. THE INVESTMENT THRESHOLD PRICE FORMULA
The investment threshold price, P2*, is given by:
QNId (1 Cd)(1- S) +Cd( 
I -T )T
- Tr + 1,'- rr "
P Ifl (I - e-"T) RQ(1 - s + rls) xT rTr
+ (1- Q)(I,(1 - s) -cj S)
where
Q = the probability development will succeed
R = total reserves
N = number of wells required to recover reserves
T = time period required to recover reserves
3 = required after-tax "dividend" rate
r = the after-tax riskless interest rate
s = tax rate
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r7= percentage depletion rate
Id = cost to drill and complete a well
I, = exploration cost for the property
I, = cost to drill, but not complete, a well
Cd = 0 if development costs are expensed, 1 if capitalized
c, = 1 if exploration costs are expensed with recapture, 0 otherwise
ce = 0 if exploration costs are expensed, 1 if capitalized 56
P, = a factor depending on r, 5, and the volatility of oil prices 57
It is easy to understand this equation by transposing some of the terms
from the right hand side onto the left hand side:QNI, (1-cd)(1-s)+cd( ))
PRQ(1-s +rs)(1-e'r)- /A X -Qsle cr( -e  ce
+(1l-O)(1- s)- cr is)
The left hand side is the probability-adjusted present value of after-tax
revenues that will flow from development,58 and the term in square
brackets on the right hand side is the probability-adjusted after-tax cost
of proceeding with development. The cost factor is inflated by an "option
multiple" equal to /31 / (/3-1). This option multiple is greater than one.5 9
As a result, the investment threshold price, P2*, must be large enough so
that the revenue factor exceeds the cost factor by the option multiple.60
56. Note that c, and c, cannot both be equal to 1. One or both must equal 0.
57. /31 is somewhat less than 2 in the cases presented in this Part and Part IV. The
formula for /31 is:
18, l 2 u 'frp 2_ r +,5 ) + '2 _ r + ,5 )2 + 2r c, 2
1 2 )22o 1
where or2dt is the variance of the rate of change in oil prices over a small time interval, dt.
58. See supra equation accompanying note 44.
59. /3P, ranges from one to infinity. As it does so, the option multiple ranges from
infinity down to one. /3I(/3,-1) is one when there is no oil price risk, and it increases mono-
tonically with the volatility of oil prices. This pattern reflects the fact that options are more
valuable when there is more risk with respect to the object of the option.
This section reports investment threshold prices for both an accretion external tax and a
cash flow external tax. The corresponding values of /3, for the two environments are 1.68
and 1.85, respectively, and the corresponding option multiples are 2.48 and 2.18, respec-
tively. When the external tax is an accretion tax, the applicable after-tax discount rate is
lower, and investors will be more patient. As a result, the option will require a higher oil
price in order to start production as reflected in the higher value of multiple /3 when the
external tax is an accretion tax.
60. If there were no price risk, that is, no possible change in oil prices, the investment
criterion would be net present value. In this case, the option multiple would be one, and
P2 would be the price that makes net present value zero.
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It is worth discussing the terms in the cost factor. The cost factor in-
cludes terms in Ie, exploration cost. These terms are only relevant if ex-
ploration costs are capitalized or expensed and recaptured. 61 Expensing
with recapture (cr = 1) will come into play only if development is success-
ful. In addition to the sunk exploratory costs, the investor must spend I,
on a test well regardless of whether development succeeds or fails. The
last term in the cost factor reflects the fact that with probability (1-Q)
development will fail, and the investor will be able to write off I, and any
exploratory costs that were capitalized.62
The first term in the cost factor represents the treatment of develop-
ment costs for the case where the development is successful. As a result,
this term is multiplied by the probability, Q, of success. The term is also
multiplied by N, the number of wells required, since the taxpayer must
pay Id per well to develop the property. When N is larger, development
costs will loom larger relative to exploration costs in the cost factor, and
the cost factor itself will be larger. A larger cost factor means that the
investment threshold price will be larger. This pattern makes sense. An
investor will require a higher reward to exercise an option if the price of
exercising it is higher.
The first part of the second term in the cost factor represents the pen-
alty that occurs if expensed exploratory costs are recaptured. 63 The pen-
alty rate is equal to the present value of capitalizing a dollar of costs
minus the present value of deducting that dollar. Thus, the "expensing
plus recapture" approach for exploratory expenses will tend to encourage
exploration but discourage development.
The following Sections contain tables with investment threshold prices
computed under various assumptions. In order to compute these prices,
it is necessary to use particular values for the parameters in the equation
for P2* above. The rest of this Part uses the following parameter values in
all the tables:
rp (pre-tax riskless rate) = .05
a (expected growth rate of oil prices) = .04
yp (pre-tax risk premium) = .03
s (tax rate) = .4
q (percentage depletion rate) = 0 or .225
Id (development cost per well) = 500,000
l (exploration cost per property) = 100,000
I, (cost to drill test well) = 375,000
61. The mathematics indicates this point by the fact that either cr or c, must be one for
the terms to matter. If exploration cost is expensed (i.e., if cr and c, are both zero), then it
has no impact on the decision to develop since it is a sunk cost that has already been fully
deducted.
62. If the taxpayer expensed the exploratory costs, then there will be no further recov-
ery if development proves that the project is a failure.




The results use two alternative external taxes to derive after-tax discount
rates. One external tax is a cash flow tax. This external tax implies that
the after-tax riskless rate, r, and the after-tax required "dividend" rate, 3,
will be equal to their pre-tax values. In other words, r = rp = .05, and 3 =
rp + yp - a = .04. The other external tax is an accretion tax at a twenty
percent rate. This external tax will cut the after-tax riskless return re-
quired in the oil and gas sector to r = rp (1-.2) = .04 from .05, and the
after-tax required dividend rate will be 5 = .0297.64
Well parameters Q (probability of successful development), R (total
recoverable reserves), N (number of wells required), and T (time period
required to recover reserves) vary from case to case.
B. PROBABILITY EFFECTS
An earlier Section argued that capitalizing intangible drilling costs
might have differential effects on development projects with different
probabilities of success. The following table considers a series of devel-
opment projects involving ten wells with a well life of seven years each.
The projects differ in the probability of successful development, but total
reserves are set for each project so that in the absence of taxes, the
threshold price for development would be $16 per barrel. The table re-
ports development threshold prices for various tax scenarios.
The first column of numbers is simply the probability of development
success for each project. The second column reports the results for ex-
pensing of both exploratory and development costs. These results are
identical to the no-tax results: $16 is the threshold price for each project.
This pattern occurs because we are assuming an external cash flow tax.
Expensing of all costs means that cash flow taxation applies internally as
well. As a result, we have a global cash flow tax, and this tax will not
affect value or prices, at least in the absence of general equilibrium
effects. 65
The fifth column is a case that focuses on the policy of capitalizing
IDCs since development costs are capitalized.66 Exploratory costs are ex-
pensed. High probability projects suffer higher threshold prices, ranging
up to $17.67 per barrel for a "sure thing" situation. When the probability
of success is only .01, the threshold price is $16.20, very close to the $16
no-tax price. In this case, there is a .99 probability that the taxpayer will
be able to write off the cost of the test well, and only a .01 probability that
the taxpayer will have to capitalize any costs. As a result, this case is
64. See supra equation accompanying note 46 (formula for (5).
65. See supra note 45.
66. Development costs include the cost of tangible equipment that is subject to depre-
ciation and is salvageable if a well turns out to be a dry hole. I ignore this "tangible"
component throughout the article and assume that all development costs are "intangible
drilling costs." This assumption would be correct if the taxpayer rented any depreciable
equipment that was used in development. The rental cost then amounts to an intangible
drilling cost since the taxpayer will not recover the rental cost through oil production for




Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Probabilities of Successful Development
Number of Wells = 10
Well Life = 7 years
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
probability expense capitalize expense expense capitalize expense
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
.01 16.00 13.47 16.00 16.20 13.67 16.20
.05 16.00 14.25 16.01 16.69 14.94 16.70
.1 16.00 14.75 16.02 17.00 15.74 17.01
.2 16.00 15.21 16.03 17.28 16.49 17.31
.3 16.00 15.42 16.03 17.42 16.84 17.45
.4 16.00 15.55 16.03 17.50 17.05 17.53
.5 16.00 15.63 16.03 17.55 17.18 17.58
.6 16.00 15.69 16.03 17.59 17.28 17.62
.7 16.00 15.74 16.03 17.61 17.35 17.65
.8 16.00 15.77 16.03 17.64 17.41 17.67
.9 16.00 15.80 16.03 17.65 17.45 17.69
1.0 16.00 15.82 16.03 17.67 17.49 17.70
close to total expensing, a
threshold price of $16.
policy that would yield exactly the no-tax
Returning to the third column, capitalizing exploration costs results in
similar effects. For low probability projects, there is a high likelihood that
the taxpayer will be able to deduct the previously capitalized exploration
costs immediately. This reduces total expected costs and permits a lower
threshold price. Thus, the threshold price increases with the probability
of development success. Note also that all the threshold prices in the
third column are less than $16, the no-tax threshold price. Allowing the
taxpayer to expense or capitalize exploration costs when and only when
development begins is a "tax bonus" that encourages development, low-
ering the threshold price. The taxpayer has spent the exploration costs in
the past, and, consequently, they do not have any non-tax impact on total
expected costs or the development threshold price. Part IV will show
that this policy simultaneously significantly increases the exploration
threshold. Thus capitalizing exploration expenses causes less exploration
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combined with more intensive immediate development of the explored
areas.
Turning to the fourth column, it appears that recapture of expensed
exploration costs has little impact on the development threshold price
compared to the case where exploration costs are capitalized. There are
two reasons that explain the small size of the effects. First, the "recapture
penalty," the tax detriment due to recapture of previously expensed ex-
ploration costs, typically is much smaller per dollar of exploration cost
than the tax benefit of being able to deduct, over a period of years, previ-
ously capitalized exploration costs. To illustrate the difference in magni-
tude, consider the "capitalization factor," the discounted present value of
the deductions that flow from capitalizing one dollar of costs. 67 The fac-
tor averages about .86.68 Thus, for every dollar of capitalized exploration
costs, the decision to develop means that the taxpayer will realize a
stream of deductions with present value equal to .86. The recapture pen-
alty is one minus the capitalization rate since this penalty brings previ-
ously expensed costs into income and then allows the taxpayer to recover
them over time. Given a capitalization rate of .86, the recapture penalty
is .14 per dollar of exploration costs, about a sixth as large as the capitali-
zation rate. Second, the recapture penalty only comes into play when the
development project succeeds. 69 In that case, the development costs of
$5,000,000 ($500,000 each for ten wells) are fifty times larger than the
exploration costs ($100,000). Since the recapture penalty applies to ex-
ploratory costs, it will create very little change as a proportion of total
cost and, consequently, will have very little effect on the threshold price
for development. 70
One might suspect that the recapture penalty would have more impact
if development were cheaper. The next table indicates that this reasoning
is correct, presenting development threshold prices for the case where
development costs are much lower relative to exploration costs because
only one well (instead of ten) is necessary in order to produce the
reserves. Reducing the number of required wells from one to ten means
that development costs are only five times as large as exploration costs
instead of fifty times.
67. The capitalization factor is equal to
1 - erT
rT
This factor expresses the proportion of value that the taxpayer realizes when forced to
capitalize rather than expense a cost.
68. See infra Table XIX (last number in column four, under "Capitalize Development
Costs").
69. If the project fails, the taxpayer expenses the rest of the basis, and there is no
penalty for having expensed the exploration costs earlier.
70. It is the total cost that affects the threshold price. See supra equation preceding
note 58.
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Table VI
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Probabilities of Successful Development
Number of Wells =
Well Life = 7 years
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Probability expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture I recapture
.01 16.00 13.17 16.00 16.02 13.19 16.03
.05 16.00 13.22 16.02 16.11 13.33 16.13
. 1 16.00 13.29 16.04 16.22 13.51 16.26
.2 16.00 13.42 16.08 16.42 13.83 16.50
.3 16.00 13.54 16.12 16.61 14.14 16.73
.4 16.00 13.65 16.16 16.78 14.43 16.94
.5 16.00 13.75 16.19 16.95 14.70 17.14
.6 16.00 13.85 16.22 17.11 14.96 17.33
.7 16.00 13.95 16.25 17.26 15.21 17.51
.8 16.00 14.04 16.28 17.40 15.44 17.68
.9 16.00 14.12 16.31 17.54 15.66 17.85
1.0 16.00 14.20 16.33 17.67 15.87 18.00
It is clear from column four of Table VI that reducing developmental
costs relative to exploration costs causes the effects of the recapture pen-
alty to become more prominent. The range in column four of Table VI is
$0.33 versus only $.03 in Table V. When the probability of development
success is greater, the penalty has a bigger impact on the development
threshold price.
Comparing column five in Tables V and VI indicates that the effect of
capitalizing development costs remains about the same despite the reduc-
tion in the relative significance of development costs. This result is not
surprising. In column five, exploration costs are already sunk and ex-
pensed on the owner's tax accounts. What then matters most is the im-
pact of tax policy per dollar of development costs (the only costs in the
picture), and that impact will be independent of the absolute magnitude
of those costs.
It is also useful to consider the impact of longer well life. A longer well
life means that capitalization that is recovered through cost depletion will
provide a smaller tax benefit since the deductions will be spread out over
a longer time period and therefore discounted more heavily. As a result,
the probability effect should be greater: Low probabilities increase the
chance that costs will be expensed upon failure and reduce the chance
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that capitalization with recovery through cost depletion actually will oc-
cur. Table VII verifies this reasoning.
Table VII
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Probabilities of Successful Development
Number of Wells = 10
Well Life = 20 years
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Probability expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
.01 16.00 13.48 16.01 16.47 13.94 16.48
.05 16.00 14.27 16.03 17.62 15.89 17.65
.1 16.00 14.77 16.05 18.34 17.12 18.39
.2 16.00 15.24 16.06 19.02 18.26 19.08
.3 16.00 15.46 16.07 19.34 18.80 19.41
.4 16.00 15.59 16.07 19.53 19.12 19.60
.5 16.00 15.68 16.07 19.65 19.33 19.72
.6 16.00 15.74 16.07 19.74 19.47 19.81
.7 16.00 15.78 16.08 19.80 19.58 19.88
.8 16.00 15.82 16.08 19.85 19.67 19.93
•9 16.00 15.84 16.08 19.89 19.73 19.97
1.0 16.00 15.87 16.08 19.92 19.79 20.00
The computations for Table VII replace the seven-year well life used in
computing Table V with a twenty-year well life. All of the columns in
Table VII representing capitalization of development or exploratory costs
indicate a greater increase in the development threshold price for a given
increase in probability than the corresponding columns in Table V.
So far, the results have indicated that capitalizing costs interacts
strongly with the probability of project success. Projects with higher
probabilities of success are more likely to involve capitalization and
therefore end up with significantly higher development threshold prices.
The taxpayer is better off engaging in low probability projects that have
compensating higher levels of reserves. For these projects, "on average"
the taxpayer will be able to expense much of the exploration and devel-
opment costs by writing off the costs from failed projects despite the fact
that the rules call for capitalization. The effects are larger for projects
involving longer well lives.
The presumption underlying all of the numerical examples has been
that the external tax is a cash flow tax (or equivalently, no tax). If the
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background tax were an accretion tax, the probability effects should still
be present. The effects arise because low probabilities of success provide
implicit expensing treatment through the ability to deduct the costs of
failed projects. These interactions should exist regardless of the back-
ground tax or of whether capitalization "fits in" theoretically with that
tax.
Table VIII below contains development threshold prices computed
under the assumptions of Table V except that the background tax is an
accretion tax instead of a cash flow tax.
Table VIII
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Probabilities of Successful Development
Number of Wells = 10
Well Life = 7 years
External Tax is Accretion
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Probability expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture I recapture
.01 17.59 14.81 17.60 17.77 14.99 17.77
.05 17.59 15.67 17.61 18.21 16.29 18.22
.1 17.59 16.21 17.61 18.49 17.11 18.51
.2 17.59 16.71 17.62 18.75 17.87 18.77
.3 17.59 16.95 17.62 18.87 18.23 18.89
.4 17.59 17.09 17.62 18.94 18.44 18.97
.5 17.59 17.18 17.62 18.99 18.58 19.02
.6 17.59 17.25 17.62 19.02 18.68 19.05
.7 17.59 17.30 17.62 19.05 
18.75 19.07
.8 17.59 17.33 17.62 19.06 18.81 19.09
.9 17.59 17.36 17.62 19.08 18.85 19.11
1.0 17.59 17.39 17.62 19.09 18.89 19.12
Comparing columns three through seven of this table with the corre-
sponding columns in Table V indicates that capitalization interacts with
the probability of successful development in a very similar way: The
change in development threshold price per unit of probability is nearly
the same with the two different external taxes.
It is interesting to note that almost all of the threshold development
prices are higher when the background tax is an accretion tax. The main
reason for this phenomenon is that the accretion tax reduces the required
after-tax riskless rate, and it is less costly to wait for a higher price prior
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to developing.71
A final issue is whether or not projects with low probabilities and high
reserves are an important component of the actual pool from which the
investor will choose. If not, the fact that capitalization rules create a bias
in favor of these projects may not matter much. The following Table indi-
cates the distribution of success probabilities for two categories of
projects. One category is the class of projects that the investor will de-
velop immediately after exploration, assuming that the oil price is equal
to the exploration threshold price. The second category includes projects
that the investor will not develop immediately but will develop if the
price rises up to a dollar above the exploration threshold price. This cate-
gory consists of the explored properties in "inventory" that are closest to
development. 72
Table IX
The Distribution of Development Success Probabilities
Tax Regime is Expensing of Exploratory Costs and Capitalization of Development Costs
Exploration Thmshold Price is $8.30
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
Probability Proportions for Projects Proportions for Projects with Development
Ranae Developed Immediately Threshold Prices between $8.30 and $9.30
t.l .014 .020
.A to .2 .048 .059
.2to .3 .073 .081
.31o.4 .091 .096
,4 t .5 .106 .107
t.5 o .6 .117 .116
.6 to .7 .127 .123
.7 to .g .135 .128
.8 to .9 .142 .133
9 tt .148 ,137
71. The "option multiple" is higher when the accretion tax is the background tax. As a
result, the ratio of the present value of revenues to expected costs must be higher before
proceeding. See supra note 59, and accompanying text.
It is not always the case that the development threshold price is higher when the external
tax is an accretion tax than when the external tax is a cash flow tax. See infra column two
of Table XIV (for long well lives, development threshold prices are less than $16, the value
that would apply if the external tax were a cash flow tax). Aside from the option multiple,
the development threshold price is directly proportional to
SiT
1 - 57
See supra equation preceding note 56. This factor is increasing in 8T, and 8 is .0297 when
the external tax is a 20% accretion tax versus .04 when the external tax is a cash flow tax.
For long well lives (large T), the factor will be much smaller when an accretion tax is the
external tax (versus a cash flow tax), and therefore may result in a smaller development
threshold price despite the larger option multiple that accompanies the external accretion
tax.
72. There is no fixed well life, reserve level, or number of wells. The statistics for each
category are averages from a random drawing of a very large number of projects in that
category.
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The Table indicates that there are very few projects in the lowest
probability range. However, there are quite a few projects in the .1 to .5
probability range. Looking back at Tables V, VI, VII, and VIII, it is clear
that these projects will enjoy substantially lower development threshold
prices than projects with higher development success probabilities. Part
IV discusses some additional evidence on the significance of probability
effects.73
C. PERCENTAGE DEPLETION EFFECTS
It is clear from the formula for P2", the development threshold price,
that changing the percentage depletion rate affects P2* by a multiplicative
factor that is independent of any project characteristics and of other fea-
tures of the tax regime. 74 In particular, a change in the percentage deple-
tion rate from r1 to r12 will change P2* by the following factor:
(1-s+17hS)
(1-s+72 s)
The table below assumes the same project characteristics as Table V but
increases the percentage depletion rate from zero to 22 lh%. Using rh =
0, q2 = .225, and the tax rate, s = .4, the new threshold prices will be .8696
times as large as the old threshold prices. Table X displays the new prices
that correspond to the old prices in Table V.
It will turn out that percentage depletion changes exploration threshold
prices by the same proportion that it changes development threshold
prices. 75 As a result, the effects of percentage depletion are very clear.
Adding such an allowance simply lowers exploration and development
threshold prices by a proportion that is independent of well characteris-
tics, well costs, and the characteristics of the tax regime other than the
percentage depletion rate. There is no reason to give further considera-
tion to percentage depletion, and the remaining results in the article pre-
sume no percentage depletion allowance.
D. WELL LIFE EFFECTS
Another parameter that may vary is well life. The following table con-
siders a project with a fifty percent chance of success that will require
seven wells if successful. The table presents development threshold
prices for various well lives. In each case, project reserves adjust so that
73. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
74. See supra equation accompanying note 58. Holding project characteristics, project
costs, and the tax regime other than percentage depletion constant, this equation may be
rewritten as:
P2(1- s + ls) = K
where K is a constant, s is the tax rate, and q is the percentage depletion rate.
75. See infra equation preceding note 80.
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Table X
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Percentage Depletion at 22 V2 % Rate
Various Probabilities of Successful Development
Number of Wells = 10
Welt Life = 7 years
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize developme costs
probability expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
.01 13.91 11.71 13.92 14.09 11.89 14.09
.05 13.91 12.40 13.92 14.51 12.99 14.52
.1 13.91 12.82 13.93 14.78 13.69 14.80
.2 13.91 13.22 13.94 15.03 14.34 15.05
.3 13.91 13.41 13.94 15.15 14.64 15.17
.4 13.91 13.52 13.94 15.22 14.82 15.24
.5 13.91 13.59 13.94 15.26 14.94 15.29
.6 13.91 13.65 13.94 15.29 15.03 15.32
.7 13.91 13.68 13.94 15.32 15.09 15.35
.8 13.91 13.71 13.94 15.34 15.14 15.36
.9 13.91 13.74 13.94 15.35 15.17 15.38
1.0 13.91 13.76 13.94 15.36 15.21 15.39
the development threshold price would be $16 per barrel in the absence
of taxes.
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Table Xl
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Well Lives
Number of Wells = 7
Probability of Successful Development = .5
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Well Life expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 16.00 15.46 16.01 16.47 15.93 16.48
4 16.00 15.48 16.03 16.90 16.38 16.93
6 16.00 15.49 16.04 17.31 16.80 17.35
8 16.00 15.50 16.05 17.69 17.19 17.74
10 16.00 15.51 16.06 18.05 17.56 18.11
12 16.00 15.52 16.07 18.39 17.91 18.46
15 16.00 15.53 16.08 18.86 18.39 18.94
20 16.00 15.55 16.10 19.54 19.10 19.65
25 16.00 15.57 16.12 20.14 19.70 20.25
30 16.00 15.58 16.13 20.64 20.23 20.78
35 16.00 15.59 16.15 21.09 20.68 21.23
40 16.00 15.61 16.16 21.47 21.07 21.63
Columns three, five, and six of the Table XI indicate that capitalization
of development or exploration costs results in a bias in favor of projects
with shorter well lives. This result is not surprising. The background tax
is a cash flow tax, and capitalization of costs over a longer period of time
is a bigger disadvantage compared to expensing. The recapture of ex-
pensed exploration costs also has a bigger impact for longer well lives
(column four). The penalty rate for recapture of expensed exploratory
costs is the capitalization rate minus one where the capitalization rate is
the present value of capitalizing one dollar of expenses and recovering it
through cost depletion. A longer well life means a lower capitalization
rate and a larger penalty rate.
These effects are sensitive to the "number of wells" variable. If fewer
wells are required, development costs are lower and less important rela-
tive to exploration costs. Lower relative development costs will enhance
the impact of well life under a policy of capitalizing exploration expenses
or under a policy providing for recapture of expensed exploration costs.
At the same time, the impact of well life will be lower in cases where
development costs are capitalized. The following table (Table XII), when
compared to Table XI, illustrates these effects by presenting results as-
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suming that only one well is required to produce the reserves instead of
the seven required in the Table XI example.
Table X11
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Well Lives
Number of Wells = I
Probability of Successful Development = .5
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Well Life expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 16.00 13.62 16.06 16.29 13.92 16.35
4 16.00 13.68 16.11 16.57 14.25 16.69
6 16.00 13.73 16.17 16.83 14.56 17.00
8 16.00 13.78 16.21 17.07 14.85 17.29
10 16.00 13.82 16.26 17.30 15.12 17.56
12 16.00 13.86 16.30 17.51 15.38 17.81
15 16.00 13.92 16.36 17.81 15.73 18.17
20 16.00 14.01 16.45 18.24 16.25 18.69
25 16.00 14.09 16.52 18.62 16.70 19.14
30 16.00 14.15 16.59 18.94 17.09 19.53
35 16.00 14.21 16.64 19.22 17.42 19.86
40 16.00 14.25 16.69 19.46 17.71 20.15
Another possible modification of the parameters in Table XI is to
change the probability of development success. A lower probability
makes it less likely that the taxpayer will face capitalization of costs. The
taxpayer will be able to expense development and exploration costs in a
greater proportion of cases since the failure rate is higher. A lower
probability should therefore mitigate the well life effects that arise from
capitalization rules.
The next table (Table XIII), when compared to Table XI, indicates that
this reasoning is correct. This new table computes development threshold
prices under the same assumptions as Table XI except that the probability
of development success is ten percent instead of fifty percent. The in-
crease in development threshold price due to a given increase in well life
is lower for all the columns (three through seven) that involve capitaliza-
tion rules.
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Table XII1
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Well Lives
Number of Wells = 7
Probability of Successful Development =.
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Well Life expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 16.00 14.46 16.01 16.26 14.72 16.27
4 16.00 14.46 16.01 16.51 14.97 16.52
6 16.00 14.47 16.02 16.74 15.21 16.76
8 16.00 14.48 16.03 16.95 15.43 16.98
10 16.00 14.48 16.03 17.16 15.64 17.19
12 16.00 14.49 16.04 17.35 15.83 17.39
15 16.00 14.49 16.05 17.61 16.10 17.66
20 16.00 14.51 16.06 18.00 16.50 18.05
25 16.00 14.52 16.07 18.33 16.85 18.40
30 16.00 14.52 16.07 18.62 17.14 18.69
35 16.00 14.53 16.08 18.87 17.40 18.95
40 16.00 14.54 16.09 19.08 17.62 19.17
So far, results have been for the case where the background tax is a
cash flow tax. Consider instead a 20% accretion tax as a background tax.
A 20% accretion tax rate will reduce the riskless rate of return by 20%
compared to the riskless rate in a cash flow world or in a world with no
taxes. This reduction means investors will discount future returns at a
lower rate. However, the accretion tax also reduces the returns them-
selves by the same 20%. The two effects cancel out so that value (for
projects in the "external" non-oil and gas sector) is independent of the
tax.
76
Since the external accretion tax determines required rates of return,
the discount rate in the oil and gas sector also will be 20% lower. Reve-
nues in the oil and gas sector are subject to cash flow treatment. If the
taxpayer can also expense exploration and development costs, then the
oil and gas sector will receive pure cash flow treatment. In effect, the
government will reduce the taxpayer's investment, and the taxpayer will
earn tax-free returns on the remainder. 77 The reduced discount rate (due
to the external, but dominant, accretion tax) will apply to these returns,
76. See supra text accompanying note 10.
77. See supra note 45.
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and the taxpayer's project will be worth more than it would be if the
external tax were a cash flow tax. The advantage of discounting with a
reduced rate will have a greater effect when returns are further in the
future. As a result, expensing of costs when the external tax is an accre-
tion tax should favor projects with long well lives.
Column two of the following table (Table XIV) indicates that the effect
is quite significant. This column presents threshold prices when rule of
expensing all costs applies. Given that revenues receive cash flow treat-
ment, column two represents a pure cash flow tax in the oil and gas sector
combined with a pure accretion tax that applies in all other sectors. Mov-
ing from the tenth percentile well life of around two years to the ninetieth
percentile well life of around twenty years causes a $1.40 drop in the
threshold development price. Column two in Table XIV is radically dif-
ferent from the same column in Table XI, where the threshold price is
constant (and independent of well life) at $16 per barrel.
Table XIV
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Various Well Lives
Number of Wells = 7
Probability of Successful Development = .5
External Tax is Accretion
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Well Life expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 18.03 17.42 18.04 18.45 17.84 18.46
4 17.85 17.26 17.87 18.67 18.07 18.69
6 17.68 17.10 17.71 18.86 18.28 18.89
8 17.51 16.95 17.55 19.03 18.47 19.07
10 17.35 16.81 17.40 19.19 18.64 19.24
12 17.19 16.66 17.26 19.33 18.79 19.39
15 16.97 16.46 17.04 19.51 18.99 19.58
20 16.63 16.14 16.72 19.75 19.26 19.84
25 16.31 15.85 16.41 19.92 19.47 20.03
30 16.02 15.59 16.14 20.05 19.62 20.17
35 15.76 15.35 15.89 20.15 19.73 20.27
40 15.53 15.13 15.66 20.21 19.81 20.34
Now consider shifting from expensing treatment for all costs to one of
the other five cost treatments in the Table. Such shifts in Table XIV
cause almost the same change in development threshold prices as the
equivalent shifts in Table XI. Once we have corrected for the overall
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impact of embedding the oil and gas sector in an accretion tax world in-
stead of a cash flow tax world, the relative effects of various policies re-
main the same.
E. DEVELOPMENT COST EFFECTS
A final factor to consider is variation in development cost. This cost
depends primarily on the number of wells required to recover the
reserves. Each extra well adds $500,000 in costs so that recovery through
one well ($500,000 development cost) will be much less costly than
through ten wells ($5,000,000 development cost). Since exploration cost
is fixed at $100,000, varying the number of wells also changes the relative
role of development and exploration costs.
The next Table presents development threshold prices for a project
with a well life of seven years and a fifty percent probability of develop-
ment success. The number of wells varies, and reserves for each project
are set in a compensating manner (more wells, more reserves) so that the
development threshold price is $16 per barrel in a setting with no taxes.
Table XV
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Varying Development Cost
Well Life = 7 years
Probability of Successful Development = .5
External Tax is Cash Flow or None
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Number of expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
Wells exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 16.00 14.57 16.12 17.21 15.78 17.33
4 16.00 15.17 16.07 17.40 16.58 17.47
6 16.00 15.42 16.05 17.48 16.90 17.53
8 16.00 15.55 16.04 17.52 17.07 17.56
10 16.00 15.63 16.03 17.55 17.18 17.58
12 16.00 15.69 16.03 17.57 17.26 17.59
15 16.00 15.75 16.02 17.59 17.34 17.61
20 16.00 15.81 16.02 17.61 17.42 17.62
25 16.00 15.85 16.01 17.62 17.47 17.63
30 16.00 15.87 16.01 17.63 17.50 17.64
35 16.00 15.89 16.01 17.63 17.52 17.64
40 16.00 15.90 16.01 17.64 17.54 17.64
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It is easy to explain the pattern in the table. In column three, the
threshold prices increase along with the number of wells, almost reaching
the $16 per barrel no-tax figure. This column represents a policy of capi-
talizing only exploration costs. Capitalizing exploration costs results in a
"tax bonus" at the development stage that lowers the after-tax cost of
development. 78 A lower development cost implies a lower development
threshold price than the $16 no-tax price. As the number of wells in-
creases, exploration cost becomes negligible relative to development cost
and total cost. As a result, the fact that taxpayers receive a tax bonus in
the form of being able to capitalize (already sunk) exploration costs does
not have very much impact.
Capitalization of development costs causes the development threshold
price to increase with the number of wells for different reasons. Consider
column five of the table. The prices in this column are higher than those
in column two since capitalizing (versus expensing) development costs in-
creases after-tax cost so that investors will require higher oil prices before
developing. The relative impact of capitalizing development costs in-
creases with the number of wells since an increase in the number of wells
increases the relative share of development cost in total cost. The range
of increase in column five is rather small because development costs are a
large proportion of total cost to begin with.
The recapture penalty increases after-tax development cost, and there-
fore also increases development threshold prices: The prices in column
four are all larger than the no-tax price of $16. The impact of the recap-
ture penalty falls off with the required number of wells, since the penalty,
along with exploration costs, becomes increasingly overshadowed by the
increased development costs that result from the larger number of wells.
None of the reasoning that explains the results in Table XV involves
the timing of costs. As a result, one would expect the same pattern of
development cost effects to occur if the external tax is an accretion tax
instead of a cash flow tax. The next table (Table XVI) verifies that con-
clusion. The prices in the table are computed using the same assumptions
as in Table XV except that an accretion tax is the external tax instead of a
cash flow tax.
Switching the external tax to an accretion tax increases the threshold
development price for the case of expensing all costs to $17.59 from $16.
Otherwise, the patterns in Table XVI are identical to the ones found in
Table XV.
78. The taxpayer incurred the costs earlier, at the exploration stage. Proceeding with
development means that the taxpayer will begin receiving the tax benefits associated with
the exploration costs without paying any such costs currently.
1726 (Vol. 55
20021 TAXING NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES 1727
Table XVI
Investment Threshold Price for the Development Option
Varying Development Costs
Well Life = 7 years
Probability of Successful Development = .5
External Tax is Accretion
expense development costs capitalize development costs
Number of
Wells expense capitalize capitalize expense capitalize capitalize
exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration exploration
costs costs costs with costs costs costs with
recapture recapture
2 17.59 16.00 17.70 18.68 17.09 18.79
4 17.59 16.67 17.66 18.86 17.93 18.92
6 17.59 16.94 17.64 18.93 18.27 18.97
8 17.59 17.09 17.63 18.96 18.46 19.00
10 17.59 17.18 17.62 18.99 18.58 19.02
12 17.59 17.25 17.62 19.00 18.66 19.03
15 17.59 17.31 17.61 19.02 18.74 19.04
20 17.59 17.38 17.61 19.04 18.83 19.05
25 17.59 17.42 17.60 19.05 18.88 19.06
30 17.59 17.45 17.60 19.06 18.91 19.07
35 17.59 17.47 17.60 19.06 18.94 19.07
40 17.59 17.49 17.60 19.06 18.96 19.07
IV. TAXES AND THE EXPLORATION OPTION
Computing threshold prices for the exploration option is more difficult
than computing such prices for the development option. Exercising the
development option meant that the investor also would execute the ensu-
ing production option.79 In contrast, exercising the exploration option
means paying a certain amount of money to draw a development option
at random. If the development project is good enough, the investor will
proceed to development (and production). However, bad draws will go
into an inventory of explored, but undeveloped, properties.
There will be some investment threshold price, PI*, for the exploration
option. If the oil price is above P1*, exploration will proceed. Every time
the investor explores a property, the result will be a potential develop-
ment project, characterized by R (recoverable reserves), N (number of
wells required), T (time required to recover), and Q (probability of devel-
opment success). For each development project, there will be a develop-
ment threshold price, P2*. If P1" > P2, then the investor will immediately
79. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
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develop the prospect. On the other hand, if P,* < P 2* and the current oil
price is P1*, the investor will delay development until prices are higher.
The equation for the development threshold price, P2*, was a simple
formula expressing that price as a function of known parameters like R,
N, Q, T, and the costs of exploration and development. The situation is
not as straightforward for the exploration threshold price, P*. This price
will depend on the averages of parameters R, N, Q, and T, conditional on
immediate development. "Conditional on immediate development"
means that we consider the average only over the pool of all projects that
the investor would develop immediately given a current oil price of Pl*.
We express this conditional average by the notation EM(). Thus, EM(R)
means the average reserves over all projects that the investor would de-
velop immediately. Since projects that are worth developing early will
tend to be particularly good projects, EM(R) will tend to be larger than
the average value of reserves for all possible projects.
Note that the conditional averages assume that P* is the current price.
Thus, computing these averages requires knowing PI*. This makes life
difficult since the equation for P1* itself depends on the averages. We
have to solve for P1* and the averages simultaneously.
The equation for P1 also depends on the probability that an explora-
tion draw will result in immediate development given that the current
price of oil is Pl*. Call this probability "Pr(M)." Where "EM{.}" means
"take the conditional average of the expression inside the curly brackets,"
the equation for P1 is:
P11pEM{ 1-e 
-S 118 QRP, Em(I" s +5
s
-( - s)IdEM{QN((1 - Cd) + Cd-"T)}
xPr(M)
+ sLEm{C (1 r '4-leMQ r cr l+c(T)
- (I,(1- s)- sce Le)EM {(1- Q)}
- I, (1- s(1- C
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Except for the conditional average operator, EM{.}, the expression in
big square brackets is familiar. It is very similar to the net present value
of a development project.80 The last three terms are the appropriate cost
terms. The first term is the present value of revenues multiplied by
(fla-1)/lx, the inverse of the "option multiple" that applies to the project.
The option multiple increases with the volatility of oil prices and is
greater than or equal to one. 81 The multiplicative factor (f1-l)/fli will be
less than or equal to one, reflecting the fact that the present value of
revenues must exceed costs by the option multiple for development to
proceed. The EM{.} operators reflect the fact that we are taking the aver-
age of the expression in square brackets (without the operators) condi-
tional on immediate development. As such, we will be taking averages of
positive terms, and the term in square brackets is the average net present
value (after reducing revenues by the inverse of the option multiple) in
excess of the amount needed to trigger immediate development. 82 This
''average surplus" in square brackets will be less than the average net
present value conditional on immediate development.83
The term in square brackets is multiplied by Pr(M), the probability of
drawing a project that an investor will develop immediately. Since the
average surplus represented in the square brackets is an average condi-
tional on immediate development, the square bracket term times Pr(M)
represents the expected surplus from exploring a property. At the price
P,*, this expected surplus must be exactly equal to the cost of exploring a
property. Subtracting this cost, Ie[1-S(-Ce)], must yield zero if we plug in
P1*. At lower prices, the expected gain will be smaller, and exploration
will not be worthwhile. 84
A. INVESTMENT THRESHOLD PRICES
Table XVII below presents exploration threshold prices for the six tax
scenarios under consideration. The computations for this table assume
that the external tax is a cash flow tax.
80. See supra equation preceding note 58 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 59.
82. At the development threshold price, the expected present value of revenues is
equal to the option multiple times expected costs. See supra text accompanying note 58.
That is, the term in square brackets (without the expectation operators present) would be
zero at this price. We are averaging over all cases where the exploration threshold price is
greater than the development threshold price. At that higher price, the expression in
square brackets (without the expectation operators) will be greater than zero.
83. The reason for the difference is that immediate development means giving up the
option to develop later. The expected net present value stemming from immediate devel-
opment needs to be reduced by the value of that option to have a true measure of surplus.
84. Since Pr(M) and the averages conditional on development depend on P1*, actually




Investment Threshold Prices for the Exploration Option
(in dollars per barrel)
No-Tax Threshold Price is 7.81
External Tax is a Cash Flow Tax
expense development costs capitalize development costs
expense exploration costs 7.81 8.30
capitalize exploration costs 9.11 9.69
expense exploration costs 7.83 8.31
with recapture
The most striking result in the Table is the large effect that arises from
capitalizing exploration costs. This policy increases the exploration
threshold price by $1.30 which represents an increase of about one-sixth
over the no-tax value of that price. The size of the effect is not entirely
surprising. Capitalizing exploration costs increases the immediate after-
tax cost of exploration substantially, from $60,000 per property to
$100,000 per property. Furthermore, under a policy of capitalization of
exploration costs and a current oil price equal to the threshold price, the
investor will develop only about nine percent of explored properties im-
mediately. The ability to recover exploration costs for the other projects
is put off into the indefinite future. Increased cost means that investors
will require higher prices before engaging in exploration.
An earlier Section mentions an important caveat with respect to the
apparently large impact of capitalizing exploration expenses on the explo-
ration threshold price. The computed prices do not take into account the
ability of the taxpayer to realize losses on low-value properties right after
exploration, and later on if prices fall.85 About fifty-nine percent of ex-
plored properties will be worth less than the $100,000 exploration cost
given an oil price equal to the exploration threshold. The average loss for
properties in this class will be around $83,000. In addition, properties
initially worth more than $100,000 may decline below $100,000 in value,
permitting losses that represent a portion of the exploration cost to be
taken prior to the time that this cost is deducted under the capitalization
scheme. The total value of the ability to take losses may eliminate as
much as eighty percent of the gap between the threshold price for the
case of capitalizing exploration costs and the case of expensing. 86 As a
result, loss-taking is a potentially important phenomenon. A capitaliza-
85. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
86. Computing the impact of loss-taking precisely in the model is very difficult. The
eighty percent estimate is an upper bound for the actual number. This estimate is based on
the (unrealistic) assumption that there are no transactions costs for trading properties and
consists of three elements. First, there are immediate tax losses from properties worth less
than $100,000 right after exploration is completed. Second, there is the value of the tax
timing option for taking further losses on these properties in the future. Third, there is a
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tion rule may be largely ineffective and may induce significant social
waste as parties commit resources to completing transactions that are
solely motivated by taking tax losses.
Capitalizing development costs increases the exploratory threshold
price by about $0.50, or about six percent of the no-tax price of $7.81.
Increasing after-tax development cost diminishes the value of the devel-
opment option for explored properties but has no effect on the cost of
exploration. As a result, taxpayers will require higher oil prices in order
to offset the higher after-tax development cost with an increase in the
potential benefits of development.8 7
Finally, Table XVII indicates that the recapture of expensed explora-
tory costs has little impact on the exploration threshold price. The main
reason for this result is the same reason that explained the dearth of re-
capture penalty effects in other contexts: The recapture penalty is small
compared to the other components of development cost.
The next table (Table XVIII) indicates the impact on exploration
threshold prices of switching the external tax from a cash flow tax to an
accretion tax.88 The main change is that all the prices are higher by about
$0.80 or so. As discussed earlier, shifting the external tax to an accretion
tax from a cash flow tax reduces the after-tax discount rate in the oil and
gas sector. As a result, the potential rewards of waiting for higher prices
are greater, and threshold prices will be larger.89 The relationships be-
tween different tax policies remain about the same as in the case where
the external tax is a cash flow tax.
similar valuable tax timing option for properties worth more than $100,000 immediately
after exploration.
To compute the value of the tax timing option, I used a variant of a standard formula
developed for equities. This variant implicitly assumes that there is no event, other than
taking tax losses, that will induce the holder to dispose of the property. However, in the
model here, if the oil price rises high enough, the holder will exercise the development
option, cutting off potential future loss taking. Since these potential losses contribute to
the value of the tax timing option, using the variant overestimates the value of the tax
timing option. Unfortunately, incorporating the possibility of development into the tax
timing option formula would be very difficult, and I leave that project to future research.
The Appendix describes the computation of the estimate in greater detail.
87. Recall that the equation for determining the exploration threshold price pits the
excess benefits from development projects that will commence immediately against explor-
atory costs. See supra the equation preceding note 80 and accompanying text. Increasing
development costs reduces the excess benefits, while an increase in the oil price increases
these benefits.
88. The figures in Tables XVIII are less accurate than the figures in Table XVII. The
program used to compute the Table XVII figures is twice as sensitive to errors. The figures
in Table XVIII are still accurate to a few pennies.
89. For a more complete discussion of the impact of an accretion tax in the outside




Investment Threshold Prices for the Exploration Option
(in dollars per barrel)
Special Case: Accretion Tax as External Tax
No-Tax Threshold Price is 7.81
expense development costs capitalize development costs
expense exploration costs 8.61 9.02
capitalize exploration costs 9.99 10.50
expense exploration costs 8.54 9.04
with recapture I _II
B. OPPORTUNITY SET EFFECTS
In Part III, many of the tax policies were not neutral with respect to
development projects that differ in probability of success, level of devel-
opment cost, or well life. The Monte Carlo approach used to compute
exploration threshold prices also permits an examination of the nature of
the projects executed immediately as opposed to those placed in "inven-
tory" for later execution.
The next two tables compile statistics conditional on immediate devel-
opment and conditional on delayed development respectively. The six
main statistics are the mean probability of success, mean reserves, the
mean number of wells (mean development costs), the mean well life, the
mean "delta factor," and the mean "capitalization factor." The "delta
factor" is the present value of a dollar of revenue flow during the life of
the well. This factor uses the required after-tax "dividend" rate as the
discount rate. The capitalization factor is the present value (in terms of
an immediate deduction) of each dollar of costs that are capitalized. The
tables display conditional values of these statistics for three separate tax
scenarios: expensing of all costs, capitalization of development costs com-
bined with expensing of exploration costs, and expensing of development
costs combined with capitalization of exploration costs. Each table also
states the exploration threshold price and the probability of immediate
development for each separate tax policy. Finally, each table includes
unconditional means for purposes of comparison. These unconditional
means follow directly from the distributions assumed for the various pro-
ject characteristics.
The first table (Table XIX) contains statistics conditional on immediate
development. Projects developed immediately after exploration will tend
to have a higher probability of success, higher reserves, a smaller number
of required wells, and a shorter well life (with higher delta and capitaliza-
tion factors as a result). This tendency is evident from comparing the
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conditional means in the table (columns three, four and five) with the
unconditional means in column two.
Of greater interest is any possible distortions in the set of projects de-
veloped immediately that result from tax policy. The table assumes a
cash flow tax in the external sectors. As a result, column three, expensing
of all costs, represents a "neutral" tax policy that will leave the immediate
development set the same as without any taxes. This column thus serves
as a benchmark for examining the last two columns.
Table XIX
Statistics Conditional on Immediate Development
Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Three Tax Scenarios
(1) Expense Exploration and Development Costs
(2) Expense Exploration Costs, Capitalize Development Costs
(3) Capitalize Exploration Costs, Expense Development Costs
Statistics Conditional on Immediate Development
Unconditional
Statistics Expense Capitalize Capitalize
(for reference) All Costs Development Exploration
Costs Costs
P,* = 7.81 P, = 8.30 P* = 9.11
Prob(M) = .059 Prob(M) = .056 Prob(M) = .091
Mean Probability 0.5 0.6203 0.6161 0.6064
of Success (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Mean Reserves 1,000,000 3,087,276 3,082,803 2,722,550
(1652) (1647) (890)
Mean Number 14.75 12.5288 12.3852 12.5947
of Wells (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0044)
Mean Well Life 9.369 7.2852 6.5648 7.4222
(0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0015)
Mean Delta 0.843 0.87368 0.88432 0.87172
Factor (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Capitalization 0.812 0.84710 0.85952 0.84482
Factor Mean __ (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00002)
It is important to consider the probability of immediate development
when one compares columns. When this probability is higher, it means
that immediate development extends deeper into the pool of possible
projects. Since the best projects are done first, going deeper into the pool
should cause a drop in the average probability of success, a drop in mean
reserves, an increase in mean number of wells, and an increase in mean
well life for the class of projects developed immediately.
The results in Part III suggest that capitalizing development costs (but
not exploration costs) should cause a shift to lower probability projects,
projects with fewer wells, and projects with shorter well life. All three of
the expected effects are evident in the table. Mean well life is signifi-
cantly lower than in the benchmark case, the mean number of wells is
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significantly lower, and the mean probability of success is significantly
lower.
It is important to consider whether these effects occur because the
probability of immediate development is somewhat higher for the bench-
mark case (5.9%) versus the case of capitalization of development costs
(5.6%).9o This difference suggests a lower mean well life, a lower mean
number of wells, and a higher probability of successful development in
the case of capitalization of development costs. This predicted pattern
strengthens the case for a probability effect since the probability of suc-
cessful development is in fact lower than in the benchmark case. Further-
more, the drop in the mean well life is so large that it cannot be explained
by the very small (.3%) difference in the probability of immediate devel-
opment.91 Although the decline in the number of wells is quite a bit
smaller, it is unlikely that it is caused entirely by going deeper into the
pool.9
2
90. It is interesting to note that this lower probability of immediate development
(Pr(M)) in the case of capitalizing development costs versus the benchmark case occurs
even though the execution threshold price is lower ($7.81 versus $8.30) in the benchmark
case. Normally, a higher oil price means that it will be optimal to immediately develop a
larger proportion of the class of all possible development projects. However, capitalizing
development costs increases the development threshold price for most projects, and this
effect outweighs the effect of the higher oil price. See supra Tables V-VIII and X-XVI(columns five through seven in these tables cover cases where the taxpayer capitalizes de-
velopment costs; the development threshold prices in these columns are higher than the
prices in the corresponding columns, two through four, for cases where the taxpayer ex-
penses development costs; the differences often are substantial).
91. To prove this point, suppose that the change in mean well life from 6.56 to 7.29
years is due entirely to going deeper into the pool: 5.9% instead of 5.6%. This assumption





Solving these equations yields 6.275 for Y. As a result, the added projects must have a
mean well life of 20.91. This figure is way above the mean well life (9.82) for the remaining
pool, see infra Table XX, and would indicate that the investor is choosing inferior projects.
92. Using the same analysis as in the previous footnote, assume that the change is
entirely due to going deeper in the pool in the benchmark case. This assumption requires





Solving these equations yields 4.543 for Y. As a result, the added projects must require
15.14 wells on average. This figure is significantly above the mean number of wells per
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The final column in Table XIX represents statistics for the case of capi-
talizing exploration costs. In this case, the probability of immediate de-
velopment is very much higher than in the benchmark case-9.1 % versus
5.9%. This difference follows from two phenomena. First, the explora-
tion threshold price is $1.30 higher ($9.11 versus $7.81) in the case of
capitalization of exploration costs. A higher oil price increases the pro-
portion of projects that an investor would want to develop immediately.
Second, capitalizing exploration costs tend to decrease the development
threshold price for each project,93 so that an investor will want to develop
a larger proportion of projects immediately at any given oil price. It ap-
pears that most of the effect stems from the first factor, the increase in
the exploration threshold price.94
The results in Part III suggest that capitalizing exploration costs should
lower the probability of successful development, lower mean well life,
and lower the mean number of wells for the class of projects developed
immediately. Unfortunately, it is not possible to detect any of these ef-
fects based on the outcomes in column four of Table XIX. Mean well life
and the number of wells increase versus the benchmark case, but these
increases may be due to going much deeper into the pool. There is a
substantial and significant drop in the probability of development success,
but this drop also may be largely or entirely due to going deeper into the
pool.
The next table presents statistics for the class of projects for which an
investor will delay development given an oil price equal to the explora-
tion threshold price in each tax scenario. To some degree, the statistics
may reflect the tax-induced changes in the class of projects taken out of
the pool via immediate development. However, it is hard to separate out
the tax effects from the impact of different probabilities of immediate
development. For example, the mean probability of development success
is higher for the case of capitalization of development costs than the
benchmark case. This outcome is consistent with the predicted tax effect:
the investor will develop more low probability projects immediately, leav-
ing higher probability projects in the pool. But the outcome may also be
due to the fact that the investor goes deeper into the pool (5.9% versus
project (14.89) for the remaining pool, see infra Table XX, and would indicate that the
investor is choosing inferior projects.
93. See supra Tables V-VIII and X-XVI (in each table, the threshold prices in column
three, representing a policy of capitalizing exploration costs, are lower than the no-tax
threshold prices in column two).
94. An increase of one dollar in the oil price from the $9.11 exploration threshold
price will cause an investor to develop an additional 2.166% of all potential projects. Mul-
tiplying this 2.166% by 1.3 yields about 2.8%, most of the 3.1% gap between the 9.1%
probability of immediate development in the case where investors must capitalize explora-
tion costs and the 5.9% probability in the benchmark case. In addition, the drop in the
development threshold price due to capitalizing exploration costs usually is less than $0.50.
See supra Table V (compare columns two and three; most projects have high success
probabilities; for a success probability of .4 or more, the drop is less than $0.50), $0.50 is
much smaller than the $1.30 shift in the exploration threshold price.
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Table XX
Statistics Conditional on Delayed Development
Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Three Tax Scenarios
(1) Expense Exploration and Development Costs
(2) Expense Exploration Costs, Capitalize Development Costs
(3) Capitalize Exploration Costs, Expense Development Costs
Statistics Conditional on Immediate Development
Unconditional
Statistics Expense Capitalize Capitalize
(for reference) All Costs Development Exploration
Costs Costs
P,' = 7.81 P," = 8.30 P1 =9.11
Prob(M) = .059 Prob(M) = .056 Prob(M) = .091
Mean Probability 0.5 0.49242 0.49314 0.48929
of Success (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Mean Reserves 1,000,000 868,967 877,527 826,749
(226) (220) (160)
Mean Number 14.75 14.8904 14.8885 14.9659
of Wells (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0037)
Mean Well Life 9.369 9.7870 9.8199 9.8626
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Mean Delta 0.843 0.84107 0.84057 0.84011
Factor (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Capitalization 0.812 0.80981 0.80922 0.80871
Factor Mean (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
5.6%) in the benchmark case, so that the remaining projects should have
a lower probability on average.
The lack of discriminatory power with respect to the statistics for
delayed projects is due to the fact that the investor will develop only a
small proportion of the total pool of projects immediately-around 6%
for the benchmark case. The great mass of projects in the delayed group
will have development threshold prices much higher than the exploration
threshold prices used to delineate the immediate development border-
line, regardless of the tax policy that applies. This great mass of projects
dominates the determination of the means in Table kX, and drowns out
effects that depend on the peculiar traits of the much smaller group of
projects removed from the pool.
One method to address this problem would be to examine the traits of
the some subset of delayed projects likely to be developed soon. For in-
stance, one might compute statistics for projects that would be developed
if the oil price increases one dollar above the exploration threshold
price.95 Nonetheless, computing such statistics does not seem worth-
95. Part III used exactly this approach to examine the frequency of low probability
projects in the set consisting of delayed projects that are the strongest candidates for early
development. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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while. The outcomes in Table XIX indicate significant tax effects for the
pool of projects developed immediately, at least for the case of capitaliz-
ing development costs. One would expect to see the same pattern of ef-
fects for the set of projects in the delayed pool that the investor would
develop next.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Oil and gas projects consist of a series of options. The mineral owner
must first decide whether to spend money on "exploration" in order to
learn the extent of potential reserves, the cost and timing of recovering
the reserves, and the probability that the reserves are actually recover-
able. The mineral owner holds an "exploration option" since the owner
need not explore immediately but may wait until an increase in mineral
prices makes the potential rewards from exploration more promising.
After exploration of a property, the owner holds a "development op-
tion." The owner may pay to drill a test well to see if the reserves are
recoverable, or the owner may put off any such test until prices are
higher. If the test well proves there are recoverable reserves, the owner
has a "production option." This option consists of the ability to complete
the test well as a producer, and to drill and complete any other wells
required to completely drain the recoverable reserves.
The incentives for exploration, development, and production depend
on the "threshold prices" at which an investor will execute each option.
One way to examine the impact of tax policy is to determine how various
policies affect threshold prices. This article looks primarily at the impact
on exploration and development threshold prices, using a simplified pro-
duction model that collapses and combines the production option into the
development option.
Capitalizing rather than expensing development costs (such as intangi-
ble drilling costs) creates incentives to do projects that have a lower
probability of success, that have shorter well lives, and that have lower
development costs. This shift in incentives creates a nonneutrality, caus-
ing investors to develop some properties prematurely while unduly delay-
ing the development of other projects. These effects are apparent both
from calculating development threshold prices and from examining the
nature of the pool of projects developed immediately after exploration.
Capitalizing development costs also causes a slight increase in the explo-
ration threshold price and therefore reduces exploration. These effects
are present whether the dominant "external" tax is a cash flow tax or an
accretion tax.
Although it is quite apparent that these tax effects are present, their
economic significance is not clear. Determining this significance will re-
quire simulations over a large set of possible price paths. The variation in




Capitalizing rather than expensing exploration costs (such as the costs
of seismic analysis of potential underground deposits) results in a more
complicated pattern of effects. This policy causes a large increase in the
exploration threshold price, thereby reducing exploration. Since the tax-
payer will not recover capitalized exploration costs until development,
this policy also reduces the cost of development and lowers development
threshold prices. As a consequence, capitalizing exploration costs results
in more intensive development and production of known reserves as well
as reduced exploration. This pattern is undesirable if the goal is to en-
hance national security by encouraging the creation of a pool of reserves
that are available for immediate exploitation in case foreign supplies be-
come unavailable.
It also is possible that taxpayers may be able to circumvent most of the
impact of rules require capitalization of exploration costs by strategically
realizing losses. This possibility may blunt the undesirable national secur-
ity impact of such rules, but the costs of the associated trading are social
costs that would not arise under expensing.
Capitalizing exploration costs also causes distortions in development
project choice that are similar to the distortions caused by capitalizing
development costs. However, the distortions from capitalizing explora-
tion costs are smaller because the after-tax impact of development costs is
much larger than the tax benefits available at the development stage from
capitalized exploration costs.
VI. APPENDIX: DERIVATIONS
This Appendix derives the formulae set forth in the text and the formu-
lae required to compute the values presented in the tables. Section A
develops the net present value and option price formulae, Section B the
threshold price formulae, and Section C the tax parameter formulae.
Section D details the computation of an upper bound for the value of the
tax losses connected with the development option.
A. DERIVING NET PRESENT VALUE AND OPTION VALUE
We shall derive threshold prices, the prices at which it is optimal to
exercise various options. Doing so is a standard exercise in continuous
time finance.97 The value of production, development and exploration
options will depend on the current price of the mineral and on the
stochastic properties of that price. Focusing on crude oil, we begin with a
stochastic process that describes the evolution of price over time. In par-
96. For a more detailed description of the potential use of simulations, see supra text
accompanying notes 35-36.
97. An elementary reference is DAVID C. SHIMKO, FINANCE IN CONTINUOUS TIME




ticular, as discussed in the text,98 we assume that the oil price process is
driven by geometric Brownian motion:
dP = a P dt + o P dz
This equation means that prices tend to increase at the rate a, but the rate
is subject to a normally distributed perturbation with mean zero and vari-
ance c2 dt. If the required expected return on oil projects is p, then 3 = p -
a, is the opportunity cost for delaying exercise of the option. The idea is
that oil in the ground appreciates in value at an expected rate of a but
one can expect to earn p = 6 + a if the option is exercised and the oil is
immediately available for sale or use. 99 The oil price, P, depends on time,
t. Nonetheless, for the sake of notational simplicity, we suppress the time
dependence, writing P instead of P, or P(t).
Now consider a well. Assume that the well contains R in reserves, that
it will take time T to produce all of the reserves, that the extraction rate is
constant, that the cost of drilling the well is Id, that operating costs are
zero, and that the well cannot be restarted if it is shut down. Under these
assumptions, the operators will continue to run the well until all of the
reserves are depleted once they start production.
In this case, the value, V, of the well will depend on the oil price, P, and
the elapsed time, t, since production began. So V = V(Pt). Since P
evolves via geometric Brownian motion, and since cash flow is at the rate
RP/T, the following partial differential equation holds for V:100
I o2p V" + aPVP -MV -V, +RP = 0.
2 T
The solution to this equation is:1OI
V (P,)= P -e 1 a)(T -t) 1 RP [ e-(1-a)(T -t)
T(g-o) L i6T
Subtracting the well cost yields the formula for net present value as
stated in the text:
NPV (P,t) = RP [I -e -(M - )(T- )]- d.
,T P
98. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
99. If the option were a standard call option based on the price of a common stock, d
would represent the expected dividend rate and d the expected rate of capital gains. Hold-
ing the option means giving up the dividend return during the holding period. See DIXIT &
PINDYCK, supra note 37, at 149. For an oil project, the terminology is different. Holding a
production option rather than producing means giving up the "convenience yield" of hav-
ing oil immediately available for sale or use. See id. at 178-79.
100. See SHIMKO, supra note 97, at 20, 36, 40. Using Shimko's notation for the parame-
ter values, our case involves a = 'h c2, b = a, c = -p, d = - RIT, and e = m = n = 0.
101. See id. at 41.
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This formula for net present value ignores taxes and assumes that only
one well is required to drain the reserves. In the text model, taxes reduce
revenues by the proportion (1 - s - rs) where s is the tax rate and il the
percentage depletion proportion that apply. In addition, costs will be re-
duced by the proportion (1 - s) if the taxpayer can expense the costs and
by the proportion (1- s(-e-r)/rT) where r is the after-tax interest rate if
the taxpayer must capitalize the costs. 10 2 As a result, the formula for net
present value becomes:
NPV(P') = (I -s +?7s)RP rT -Cd)(l -s) +cd( 
-S -e-'T-t)
]_ I L r(T -t)J
where Cd is one if development costs are capitalized and zero if they are
expensed.
We now consider the value of the option to produce the oil reserves
from the well. Until exercise of the option, there are no cash flows, and
upon expiration, the option will be worthless. As a result, the value of
the production option will have the following functional form:' 0 3
F3(P) = AIP' + A2 PP
where /3 > 0 > P2. The option must decrease in value as the oil price P
falls. As a result, A 2 = 0, and the functional form for the option value is
simply:
F 3 (P) =A,P '.
At the threshold price, "value-matching" and "smooth-pasting" condi-
tions must apply. I.e., the value of the option to produce must be equal to
the net present value of immediately undertaking production, and the de-
rivative with respect to price of the option value and the production value
must be equal.' 0 4 Value matching means that the threshold price P3" must
satisfy F3(P3*) = NPV(P3 ,O) = V(P 3*,O) - Id. The smooth pasting condition
means that the derivatives of both sides of the value matching relation-
ship must be equal. For our case (with N = 1 and s = 0), the value match-
ing condition implies:
102. For a detailed discussion of these tax adjustments, See supra text accompanying
notes 26-27.
103. The functional form and threshold price of the production option are denoted with
a subscript "3." The motivation is that production is the third stage. The first stage is
exploration and the second is development. Functional forms and threshold prices for
those stages will have subscripts "I" and "2" respectively.
104. If the option is worth more than the value of producing, it is not optimal to exer-
cise the option. As soon as the production value exceeds the option value, the option
holder should exercise. It is not optimal to hold onto the option when its value is less than
the value of producing immediately. The necessity of the smooth-pasting condition for
optimality is more complicated. For a good discussion, see AVINASH K. DIxIr, THE ART
OF SMOOTH PASTIN 36-37 (1993).
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Al P3* RP3 [ l e-r]_Id.
The smooth-pasting condition implies:
fAP 3 *~'' 3T -1 -e 1
Solving these two conditions for P3* and A, yields:
P3* =f_ 6 3TId
( -I 1-e -6T)R
and
A 0- /3 - l 
R( - e- )
A d T13 )
It also is possible to show that: 0 5
aV°2 _ 92 U2
3=- -3)+ (--r+5)2 +2 ar
where r is the after-tax riskless rate.
The numbers in Table I of the text were computed using these formulae
(with s = 0 and N = 1) for net present value, the value of the production
option, and the threshold price for the production option.
B. DERIVING THRESHOLD PRICES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND
EXPLORATION OPTIONS
The derivation of the formula for the development option is very simi-
lar to the derivation of the formula for the production option in the previ-
ous Section. The first step in development is drilling a test well. In the
model developed in the text, the test well will indicate either that produc-
tion is feasible or that there are no recoverable reserves. The model re-
lies on the assumption that all production traits (reserves, time required
to recover the reserves, number of wells required, etc.) are known prior
to drilling the test well. As noted in the text, this assumption means that
the owner will not begin development unless success (a test well indicat-
105. See DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 37, at 152.
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ing production is feasible) would lead to immediate production. 10 6 As a
consequence, we know that the threshold price for the development op-
tion, P2*, must be greater than or equal to the threshold price for the
production option, P3".
The same reasoning applied in the case of the production option
reveals that the functional form of the value function for the development
option is:
F2 (P) = C, P A.
where C1 is a constant. Value matching means that the threshold price P 2*
must satisfy F2(P2*) = [Q • NPV(P2*,O) - expected cost of development]
where Q is the probability that production will be feasible. The smooth
pasting condition means that the derivatives of both sides of the value
matching relationship must be equal.
To arrive at an expression for the expected cost of development, ob-
serve that there is a probability Q that development will succeed and the
owner will drill N wells at a before-tax cost of Id each to produce the
reserves. With probability 1-Q, development will not succeed, and the
owner's before-tax expenditure will be only I,, the cost of the test well
that indicated failure. As a consequence, after-tax expected cost will be:
QNI 1 [( I d( -CM S) eC (IrT
_Qsl cr( .l -e- T r  " ) c(,-e "-
I rT C r r-- T )j
+(1 -Q)(I,( (-S) -c, s)
where c, is one if exploration costs are expensed with recapture and zero
otherwise, and Ce is zero if exploration costs are expensed and one if capi-
talized. The first term is the after-tax cost of drilling N development wells
multiplied by the probability, Q, that such drilling is warranted.
The second term captures the impact that the decision to develop has
on the treatment of exploration expenditures. On a pre-tax basis, these
expenditures are a sunk cost and have no further effect on value. How-
ever, capitalization of these costs (or "expensing with recapture") results
in a tax impact at the time of development. In the case of expensing with
recapture (Cr = 1), the owner expensed the exploration costs but must
take them back into income at the time development begins and then
recover them again, capitalized over the development period. This has a
106. Otherwise, delaying development until the oil price is high enough to warrant im-




negative effect proportional to the difference between the present value
of one dollar of capitalized costs and one dollar of present income. This
difference is the factor in parentheses that multiplies cr in the expression
above. Alternatively, if the law required exploration expenses to be capi-
talized (ce = 1), they cannot be recovered until development begins. The
owner receives a development "bonus" in the form of lower after-tax
costs due to the fact that exploration costs finally may be written off. This
aspect is captured by the second term in the second set of square brackets
in the expression above.
The final term in the expression for expected cost reflects the outcome
when the test well indicates that production is not feasible. Thus, this
term begins with (1 - Q), the probability of that outcome. The rest of the
term reflects the after-tax cost of the test well, I,(1 - s), and the fact that if
exploration costs were capitalized (Ce = 1), the owner may now write them
off, gaining ls after-tax.
The same reasoning applied in the previous Section to derive the
threshold price for the production option yields the following expression
for the threshold price of the development option:
QNI, (1-ed) (I- S) + cd()
l 3T 1 x sI rTe -, 1 -rT
/ 3-1 (1-e "T) RQ(1-s+rqs) sl rT rT)
+ (1- Q)(Id(1- s)-calS)
where 3, has the same value as indicated in the previous Section. 0 7 This
expression generates all of the numbers in Tables V-VIII and X-XVI in
the text.
The basic approach for finding the threshold price for the exploration
option is similar but with the additional complication described in detail
in the text: exercising the exploration option means that the owner will
pay to draw a development option at random. 10 8 The exact traits of the
prospect such as recoverable reserves, the probability of development
success, the number of wells required to drain the reserves, and the time
required for recovery are not known until after the draw occurs. Suppose
that oil prices increase to P 1*, the threshold price for exercising the explo-
ration option. Exercise results in learning the parameters (R,TQ,N) of
the prospect and in receiving a development option. That option will
have its own threshold price, P2*. Depending on the parameter values
107. This formula is the same as the one for P3*, the threshold price for the production
option, except that the expected cost expression in the big square bracket replaces the
single well cost Id and revenues (P3 R) are adjusted to be after-tax by multiplying by the tax
factor (1 - s - rls). This tax factor appears in the denominator after solving for the thresh-
old price.
108. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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(R,T,Q,N), there are two cases. If these parameter values produce a very
good prospect (high R, low T, high Q, low N), then P2* will be less than or
equal to P,*, and the owner will develop the project immediately Define
the set M = {R, T, Q, N: P2 (R,T,Q,N) _ P 1*} and Pr(M) = Pr{(RT,Q,M)
e M} as the probability of being in that set. Similarly, if the parameter
values are less favorable, P2* will be greater than P1*, and the owner will
not proceed with development immediately but will have a development
option exercisable in the future. Denoting the region of R-T-Q-N space
where this result obtains as "L," the probability of being in this region is
Pr(L) = Pr{(R,T,Q,N) e L}.
I assume that s = 0 in order to simplify the derivation. It is easy to alter
the final result to include the tax parameters. In addition, define
V(P,R, TN) to be the present value of production when the oil price is P
and the prospect has traits R, T, and N. Using the same reasoning as for
the production and development options, the value of the exploration op-
tion will have the functional form:
F,(P)= D, P /,
where D, is a constant. The value matching equation will be:
F (P ) = E(,(,*)-I
where E(.) denotes expectation over the full range of (R,TQ,N) values
and 1, is the cost of exploration. The smooth-pasting condition will
equate the derivatives of the two sides of the value matching equation.
We know that:
F2 (P,*,R,T, QIN) = C, (R,T,'QN) PI, if (R, T, Q, N) cL
=QNV(P,R,T,N)-QNId-( 1 -Q)I, if(R,T,Q,N) EM
Defining EL(.) as expectation conditional on being in region L and EM(.)
as expectation conditional on being in region M, the value matching
equation becomes:
DP1P.01 = EL (C)Pl* APr(L) +EM [QNV -QNId -( -Q)It]Pr(M) -Ie
where we suppress the arguments in C,(.) and V(.) for convenience. The
smooth-pasting condition is:
/3O, D P,- = /3,E L (CI ) P1*- Pr( L) + E M [Q N V p ]Pr( M).
Multiplying the value matching equation by 3/ and subtracting P* times
the smooth-pasting condition yields:
[(' 1 -1)EM (QNV) -§IEm (QN)Id -6,E, (1 -Q)IJPr(M) =,fle
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using the fact that P1* Vp = V since V is linear in P. Rearranging using the
expression for V when N wells are required to drain reserves yields:
11 PIEM QR ---T J-Em(QN)Id-EM(1-Q)I, Pr(M)=1e
Adding in the tax parameters in the same way as we did for the develop-
ment option transforms this equation into the equation in the text:
-_ _ [" 1-e -s '
-'
1 1p;E M {QR- (I-s+r )
/83P, E,2 S T (J-s+77s)
-(1- s) IdEM {QN((l- Cd)+ Cd )*
xPr (M
+sIEMQc, C - ) +C -.e }
- (I,(1- s) - SCjEM{(1 - Q)}
-J(i-s(1-Ce))
=0.
Since the conditional averages in the equation and Pr(M) depend on
P1*, it is not possible to solve the equation directly for Pl*. Instead one
begins with a trial value for P1 , say P*, and then estimates the conditional
averages, estimates Pr(M), and, simultaneously, estimates whether P* is
close to being correct using a technique called Monte Carlo integration.
This technique is required because it is not possible to calculate the con-
ditional averages or Pr(M) independently. 10 9 For a given trial value, P*,
one draws projects at random from the set of all possible projects. If the
project is one that an investor would develop immediately, one computes
the value of the difference in the equation above. 10 If P* is correct (that
109. The conditional averages are integrals that are defined in the four-dimensional
space of parameters R, Q, N, and T. The goal is to integrate over the region where these
parameters result in a project that one will develop immediately, given P*. The boundaries
of this region are very complicated and depend on P* itself. Under Monte Carlo integra-
tion, the approach is to draw points at random from the four-dimensional parameter space
and test whether each point is a set of parameters for a project that an investor would
develop immediately. If so, the point is included in constructing the conditional averages.
110. This computation requires an estimate of Pr(M). The procedure begins by making
a preliminary estimate of Pr(M) using a random sample of eight hundred points from the
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is, equal to Pl*), then this difference, which we will call "the residual,"
should be zero on average. The procedure continues picking projects at
random and develops a mean estimate for the residual along with a stan-
dard deviation of the estimate. When the standard deviation becomes
small enough, the associated estimate of the residual is taken to be the
residual produced by P*. A separate algorithm then evaluates whether
this residual is small enough, or whether it would be desirable to test
another trial value for p,*.111
Using this approach means that the solutions for P1* are not exact. The
degree of precision depends on how large the standard deviation of the
residual estimate is permitted to be. Most of the computations that un-
derlie the tables below require that the standard deviation of the residual
be one half of one percent of the exploration cost, lh. For I, = $100,000,
this means that 95% of the time, the answer will be the right answer for
some I, within $1000 of the $100,000 figure. Some numerical experiments
indicate that this sensitivity results in values for P1* that are (with high
probability) within a penny or two of being correct.
A side benefit of the Monte Carlo approach is that it is easy to com-
pute the statistical characteristics of the pool of projects developed imme-
diately and of the projects that will be developed if the oil price moves
some fixed amount above P*.
C. DERIVING TAX ADJUSTMENTS FOR RETURN PARAMETERS
As discussed in the text, tax adjustment of the return parameters de-
pends on the tax treatment of the large "external" sector consisting of all
assets other than oil and gas properties.' 12 The need to adjust the return
parameters arises when the external tax is an accretion tax but not when
the external tax is a cash flow income tax. Assume that the pre-tax ris-
kless rate in the external sector is rp and that the pre-tax risk premium in
the external sector is yp. The goal will be to derive r and y, the riskless
rate and risk premium applicable to the oil and gas sector.
An accretion tax reduces the riskless rate by the tax rate. As a result,
owners will discount riskless after-tax returns in the oil and gas sector by
r =(1-t)rp
where tA is the rate for the accretion tax in the external sector.
Deriving the adjustment for the risk premium is more complicated.
Consider a "perpetual" well that produces R of reserves every year with-
parameter space. The preliminary estimate is equal to the proportion of the eight hundred
sample projects that an investor would develop immediately. As the procedure runs, more
random sampling occurs. The estimate of Pr(M) is updated each time the procedure picks
another sample point from the parameter space.
111. The algorithm is "Brent's method." This algorithm is reasonably fast but also will
find a solution when the underlying function is choppy or discontinuous. See WILLIAM
PRESS ET AL., supra note 40, at 251. Brent's method is particularly appropriate here since
the residual is bouncing around randomly.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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out depletion. The reasoning in Section A of this Appendix indicates that
value will be proportional to the revenue flow rate and that the revenue
flow rate is itself proportional to the oil price, P. Under the simplifying
assumption that R = 1, cash flow will be P per year, and it will be true that
V = bP for some constant b. Return, 0, consists of cash flows and capital
gains. After a short time period, dt, return includes payment for oil pro-
duction during the period at the price P + dP that applies at the end of
the period n1 3 plus the capital gain dV induced by the change in oil price
dP. The rate of return is:
dO dV +P +dP 1 +IdP
V V b)P
The stochastic term dP/P is scaled by the factor (1 + 1/b). Suppose that
the appropriate b on a pre-tax basis would be b*. Then, b* = 1 / [rp + yp -
a], and (1 + l/b) = 1 + rp + yp - a, where a is the expected rate of increase
in oil prices.114 Revenues in the oil and gas sector are subject to cash flow
taxation at the time of production. There will be a constant b such that V
= bX, but, in general, b will not be equal to b*. The pre-tax risk factor yp
will shift by the ratio (1 + 1/b) / (1 + 1/b) to an after-tax risk factor.
Given the relationship dP = aP dt + aP dz and that the solution V = bP,
we have the following equation:1 15
[r(1-t() + (+1 /b) Va + P.
113. Another choice would have been to assume that the price existing at the beginning
of the time interval dt applies for all production during the time period. This assumption
would result in a coefficient of 1 for the dP/P term in the text, and there would be no
correction for the pre-tax risk premium in the case where there is an external accretion tax.
The correction in that premium is small compared to the correction for the riskless rate
since the riskless rate is corrected by the factor 1-tA while the correction for the risk pre-
mium is (roughly) by a factor of tArp, smaller by almost two orders of magnitude. This
alternative adjustment factor for the risk premium would not significantly change the re-
sults in the text comparing outcomes under the two different external taxes since the im-
pact on the riskless rate applicable to the oil sector is the main difference between them.
Choice of intermediate points (at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of a small
time interval) generally will have an effect on stochastic integrals (such as the one for the
value of the oil production here). See LUDWIG ARNOLD, STOCHASTIc DIFFERENTIAL
EQUATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 59-61 (1974). However, the linearity of the re-
sults here means that the value equation would be unaffected by the choice of intermediate
point. See id. at 169, Equation (10.2.6) (connection between stochastic integrals using dif-
ferent intermediate values depends on second-order partial derivatives of the integrand-
linearity means there is no difference). However, the choice of intermediate point does
affect the correction factor for the risk premium.
114. See SHIMKO, supra note 97, at 21. In Shimko's computation with our notation,
there is no risk, and b* = 1/(rp-a). Under the external accretion tax, we must add the risk
premium y,, to r,.
115. See id. at 20.
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Substituting for (1 + l/b*) and using the fact that Vp = b and V = bP, we
have:
r(1 -t A ) +7P (1 +1 /b) -bP=abP+P.
I\ Y (1 +rp +7P -a)J
Solving for b yields:
b -=
r P(I1-tA )+Y p 1 lr p A-ap 
- a
In a pre-tax world or in the case where a cash flow tax applies to the
external sector and to the oil sector, the required expected return on oil
projects would be p = rp + yp. As a result, 5 =,p - a = rp + yp - a, and V =
b*P where b* = 1 / [rp + yp - a] = 1/6. For an oil and gas sector subject to
cash flow taxation embedded in a large external sector where accretion
taxation applies, we have b as above and b = 1/6 where:
3= rp (I--tA )'-" +7 I -r -O.1r-t-r+ -a)
D. THE VALUE OF TAX LOSSES CONNECTED WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OPTION
A rule requiring the owner to capitalize exploration costs means that
the owner will not receive any deductions for those costs until develop-
ment begins. In contrast a rule permitting expensing means that the
owner may deduct the entire amount of the exploration costs immedi-
ately. Under the capitalization rule, the initial basis of the development
option will equal the total exploration cost. Since exploration gives the
owner a "draw" from a pool of development options, a bad draw will
result in a development option that is worth much less than the basis at
the time exploration is completed. In that case, the owner may sell the
development option, realizing a loss equal to a portion of the exploration
cost. In effect, this owner will have expensed part of that cost. In addi-
tion, after sale, there is the possibility of further losses if the option drops
below the sale price. In effect, the buyer has a "tax timing option," the
ability to sell and take losses when an asset declines in value. In the case
where the development option is worth more than the exploration cost
when exploration is completed, the owner would have a similar tax timing
option. The development option may decline to a value less than the
exploration cost in the future, permitting the owner to sell and realize tax
losses at that time.
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The value of current and future tax losses -at the time of exploration
effectively shifts the capitalization rule towards an expensing rule. An
intuitive way to quantify this shift is to compare the impact of tax losses
to the case where exploration costs are partially expensed and losses have
no tax impact. For example, if the value of loss-taking is equivalent to
expensing half the exploration cost and capitalizing the rest, potential
loss-taking shifts the capitalization rule halfway toward expensing.
In order to compute an upperbound on the value of loss-taking, we
assume that transaction costs for trading the development option are
zero. With zero transaction costs, a taxpayer facing a constant marginal
tax rate will want to realize all losses as they occur. Taking losses as early
as possible rather than waiting results in earlier tax benefits, the best
strategy in the face of positive interest rates and a constant tax rate.
When exploration is completed, there is a loss case (where the ensuing
development option is worth less than the exploration cost) and a gain
case (where the ensuing development option is worth more than the ex-
ploration cost). In the loss case, the taxpayer will want to sell immedi-
ately and then buy an equivalent development option to maintain the
same portfolio of mineral properties. 116 The sale will result in a tax loss,
and there will be a timing option associated with the replacement devel-
opment option (assumed identical to the one given up in the sense of
having the same R, N, T, and Q). In the gain case, the holder of the
development option will not have a tax incentive to sell immediately, but
there will be a valuable tax timing option associated with the develop-
ment option.
Valuing loss-taking for the development option requires valuing the tax
timing option associated with the development option. We estimate the
tax timing option value by using a formula developed in a paper by
George Constantinides for the case of equities under the assumption of
zero transaction costs.1 7 Under the formula, five parameters determine
the value of the tax timing option: the riskless interest rate, the variance
of the equity price, the dividend rate, a measure of the frequency of
"forced liquidations," and the applicable tax rate. The model underlying
the formula assumes that equities must be liquidated (regardless of tax
status) with a certain probability during each period under a Poisson pro-
cess. The force parameter for the Poisson process is the measure of the
frequency of forced liquidations that appears in the formula. Forced liq-
uidation ends the scope for taking further tax losses. If forced liquida-
tions are frequent, the tax timing option will have lower value. The
116. We are assuming that taxpayer engages in a wash sale to abstract away from port-
folio adjustment issues. The restrictions on losses on wash sales in I.R.C. § 1091 do not
apply since the development option is not a "stock" or a "security." If all taxpayers trading
development options are subject to the same tax rules, including the same marginal tax
rate, then the value of the tax timing option will be capitalized into the price of the option.
As a result, the seller will realize this value regardless of whether the seller engages in a
wash sale or simply sells without purchasing an equivalent property.
117. See Constantinides, supra note 53.
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parameter for the frequency of such liquidations ranges from 0 (no forced
liquidations) to infinity (continuous liquidations). We set this parameter
equal to zero consistent with the goal of establishing an upper-bound for
the impact of loss-taking.118
The riskless interest rate, dividend rate, and tax rate are the same as
the values used in the simulations described in the text.119 Since we are
applying the formula to the development option, we need to use the vari-
ance of the value of the development option, not the underlying variance
of the oil price. We know that the value of the development option takes
the form: F2 (P) C P P'.
where C1 is a constant. Given that the oil price process is driven by geo-
metric Brownian motion, dP = aPdt + rPdz, by Ito's Lemma: 120
dF 2 =[a/8,+ -&/3 1 , (,-_ 1)] F 2 dt + OgfiF 2 dz2
As a result, the appropriate variance for valuing loss taking for the devel-
opment option is (u/31)2 rather than 02.
Given the five parameters, we use Constantinides' formula for the
value of an equity as a function of current price and basis.121 Under the
assumption of no forced liquidations, the value of the timing option as a
proportion of the variance is simply:
r= V(FB 2 ) - V(F 2 0)
B 2
where V(F 2, B 2) is the value of a development option to an owner who
purchased at price (and has tax basis equal to) B 2 when a buyer would
pay F2.122 The numerator represents the difference between the value
when the owner engages in strategic loss-taking less the value when the
owner holds the option forever. Since the denominator is the tax basis, F
is normalized per unit of dollar paid for the option. Applying Constanti-
nides formula and simplifying yields:
r='
118. There is an event in the model of this article that is similar to a forced liquidation.
In the case of the development option, if oil prices increase enough, the option will be
exercised, cutting off future possibilities for loss-taking. This event will reduce the value of
the tax timing option. As mentioned supra in note 86, computing the amount of value
reduction would be very difficult, and I leave this task for future research.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
120. See SHIMKO, supra note 97, at 13-16.
121. See Constantinides, supra note 53, at 620 (equation (10)). Given we are assuming
no forced liquidations, we can set A = 0 in equation (10), greatly simplifying the expression.
122. As a result, the value function must obey the identity V(FF) = F.
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where s is the applicable tax rate, and m is the negative root of a quad-
ratic equation whose coefficients are functions of the five parameters
listed above. 123
Taking averages in a run with a large number of draws, we obtain the
following values:
Components and Totals for Value of Loss-taking
Case: Exploration costs Case: Exploration and
capitalized; development development both
costs expensed capitalized
probability of delayed 0.910 0.916
development




average loss in "loss 0.832 0.832
case" as a proportion of
exploration costs
average tax timing 0.055 0.055
option value in loss case
average tax timing 0.230 0.229
option value in gain case
average total value of 0.323 0.321
loss-taking conditional
on delayed development
average total value of 0.294 0.294
loss-taking conditional
on delayed development,
reduced by probability of
delay
The first line indicates that development is delayed about 91% of the
time after exploration is completed. Assuming development should be
delayed, about 58% of the time the development option will be worth less
than the exploration costs, creating an immediate tax loss for the owner.
The average loss in such instances is large, about 83% of the exploration
costs-creating a reduction in taxes equal to .40 x .83 = 33.2% of the
exploration costs. The tax timing option in loss cases is worth about 5.5%
of the exploration costs on average. In the case where the development
option is worth more than the exploration costs expended, the average
123. See Constantinides, supra note 53, at 620.
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value of the tax timing option is about 23% of the exploration costs.
Combining these numbers weighted by the appropriate probabilities
yields an average total value of loss-taking equal to 32% of exploration
costs conditional on delayed development. Expensing would have re-
sulted in a value equal to 40% of exploration costs since 40% is the tax
rate. As a result, conditional on delayed development, the possibilities
for loss-taking are equivalent to expensing 80% of the exploration costs
and capitalizing the rest (without being able to take losses). The last row
in the table indicates that if we adjust for the fact that development is
delayed 91% of the time, the 32% figure falls to around 29.4% and the
80% figure to about 75%.
It is possible to run the simulations to compute threshold exploration
prices under the assumption that 80% of the exploration costs are ex-
pensed and the rest capitalized (with no ability to take tax losses). Not
surprisingly, the values for threshold exploration prices in these runs
move 80% of the way from the high level that results from assuming ex-
ploration expenses are capitalized to the low level under the assumption
that exploration costs are expensed. I do not report these simulations
here.
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